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### Manufacturing

#### Contention 1 is Mexican Manufacturing

#### TTIP agreement talks between the US and EU are coming

EC 7/12/13 – (“EU and US conclude first round of TTIP negotiations in Washington”, European Commission, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=941)//javi

The first week-long round of talks for an EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) comes to a closure today in Washington. “It’s been a very productive week”, said EU Chief Negotiator Ignacio Garcia-Bercero coming out of the talks. “We have been striving already for many months to prepare the ground for an ambitious trade and investment deal that will boost the transatlantic economy, delivering jobs and growth for both European and Americans. This week we have been able to take this negotiation to the next step. The main objective has been met: we had a substantive round of talks on the full range of topics that we intend to cover in this agreement. This paves the way to for a good second round of negotiations in Brussels in October.” Working throughout the week, the negotiating groups have set out respective approaches and ambitions in as much as twenty various areas that the TTIP - the biggest bilateral trade and investment negotiation ever undertaken - is set to cover. They included: market access for agricultural and industrial goods, government procurement, investment, energy and raw materials, regulatory issues, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, services, intellectual property rights, sustainable development, small- and medium-sized enterprises, dispute settlement, competition, customs/trade facilitation, and state-owned enterprises. Negotiators identified certain areas of convergence across various components of the negotiation and - in areas of divergence – begun to explore possibilities to bridge the gaps. The talks have been based on a thorough review of the stakeholders views expressed to date. The negotiators met also in the middle of the week with approximately 350 stakeholders from academia, trade unions, the private sector, and non-governmental organisations to listen to formal presentations and answer questions related to the proposed agreement.

#### Mexico needs to be included – expands trade and development of common standards

Negroponte 5/2/13 – Diana Negroponte is a nonresident senior fellow with the Latin America Initiative under Foreign Policy at Brookings. She focuses on Latin America and researches and writes about the New Left, populism and the relationship between criminal gangs and state institutions. Negroponte is editor of The End of Nostalgia: Mexico Confronts the Challenges of Global Competition Ph.D., Georgetown University J.D., American University B.S. Econ, London School of Economics & Political Science (Diana Villiers, “Obama’s Mexico Trip: Putting Trade and Investment at the Top of the Agenda”, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/05/02-obama-mexico-trip-trade-investment-negroponte)//javi

Investment flows are also mutually beneficial. According to the U.S. Trade Representative’s office, sales of services in Mexico by majority U.S. owned affiliates were $34.4 billion in 2010. Sales of services in the United States by majority Mexico-owned firms were $4.8 billion. According to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico, the United States currently provides 41 percent of all foreign direct investment in Mexico, benefiting more than 21,139 companies. Beyond the numbers, the reality of trade and investment is that the United States and Mexico compete together in the global economy. Production and supply chains in North America are deeply integrated with the U.S. content of Mexico exports to the United States estimated at 40 cents on the dollar. This compares to 25 cents for Canadian exports to the United States and 4 cents for China and 2 cents for the European Union, according to a Wilson Center report. In short, there exists a growing integrated manufacturing platform that takes advantage of geography, time zones and cultural affinity. The challenge ahead is how to build on that integration for the forthcoming Trans Atlantic Trade and Investment talks with the European Union. The development of common standards and regulations will impact both Mexican and Canadian industry. Therefore, they need to be either at the table, or close to the negotiations. How close will the consultations with the Mexican trade delegation be? Ideally, the Mexicans would like to be at the negotiating table, but that is improbable. More likely is a commitment from President Obama to consult closely with the Mexican delegation. This could include both pre-talks and post-talk briefings, reinforcing Obama’s call “to maintain the economic dialogue over a long period of time.” On the European side, Turkey wishes to have a close consultative arrangement with the EU negotiators. This creates a balanced need for consultations with immediate trading partners.

#### Trade declines if Mexico is not included

Felbermayr et. al. 13 – (“Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Who benefits from a free trade deal?”, GED, http://www.ged-shorts.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Study-TTIP\_final\_ENG.pdf)//javi

Table 7 examines the changes in trade in North America and between the USA and the BRICS. A few important insights are striking. First, TTIP leads to trade diversion effects within the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) between USA, Mexico and Canada. In the comprehensive liberalization scenario, both exports and imports decline for NAFTA partner countries within the region. The two NAFTA countries whose position is not improved by TTIP, Mexico and Canada, intensify their trade. That is an impressive example of trade diversion effects between countries not directly affected in anyway by TTIP: The access of these countries especially to the US market becomes less attractive due to increased competition from the EU, leading to a substantial rise in trade between them. What makes this effect so strong is that the trade barriers, as we know, between Mexico and Canada have already been eliminated. Interestingly, TTIP leads to an expansion of trade between the EU and Canada. Geographic circumstances are decisive for this result. Because of its closeness to the USA, Canada is especially affected by trade diversion effects involving the USA. This effect leads to creating trade with the EU countries that are geographically farther away, so that transport costs are lower, and the change in the relative cost structures leads to replacement of the American market with the EU. This circumstance means that finalization of an agreement between the EU and Canada, currently under negotiation, would strengthen the trade of the countries involved with each other but not eliminate the negative trade diversion effects.

#### Exclusion of Mexico hurts trade partnership

BFNA 6/17/13 – (“US, EU Benefit Significantly From TTIP”, Bertelsmann Foundation, http://www.bfna.org/article/us-eu-benefit-significantly-from-ttip)//javi

WASHINGTON, DC/GUETERSLOH, GERMANY (June 17, 2013) - The US and all EU member countries would benefit significantly from a comprehensive trade pact, according to "Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): Who benefits from a free trade deal?", an ifo Institute study commissioned by the Bertelsmann Foundation. A TTIP that eliminates non-tariff trade barriers and tariffs would boost per capita GDP and employment on both sides of the Atlantic but impose losses on much of the rest of the world. The US would achieve the greatest growth from a TTIP, with long-term per capita GDP climbing 13.4 percent. EU member states would, on average, see five-percent growth in long-term per capita GDP. The United Kingdom would be Europe’s biggest beneficiary; its long-term per capita GDP would rise 9.7 percent. Other EU member countries that would profit more than average from a far-reaching liberalization of trade include small export-oriented economies, such as those of the Baltic states, and crisis-ridden southern European countries. The large economies of Germany and France would benefit less than the EU average from a comprehensive free-trade agreement. Long-term German per capita GDP would increase 4.7 percent; the comparative French figure is 2.6 percent. Intensified trade relations between the US and the EU would decrease their imports from the rest of the world. As a result, long-term per capital GDP would drop 9.5 percent in Canada and 7.2 percent in Mexico. Japan would also see a fall, of 5.9 percent. Additional losers would include developing countries, especially those in Africa and central Asia.

#### US-Mexico trade key to resolve Mexican instability and manufacturing sector

O’Neill 3/18/13 – (Shannon, “Mexico and the United States are linked closer than ever through trade”, Voxxi, http://www.voxxi.com/mexico-united-states-linked-trade/)//javi

When it comes to Mexico, people usually think about the security issue, and that’s what much of the news coverage has been. But underneath that, behind the headlines, we have seen a transformation of Mexico’s economy over the last couple of decades: It has moved from a very closed, inward-looking economy, one whose exports were dominated by oil, to an economy that is one of the most open and increasingly competitive in the world. In measures like trade to GDP, Mexico outpaces not just the United States or places like Brazil, but it outpaces China. It is quite an open and competitive economy now. A big part of that is due to its deepening ties to the United States. Since the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) was signed almost 20 years ago, we have seen the creation of regional supply chains for a myriad of different types of industries and companies. For every product that is imported from Mexico in the US, on average 40 percent of it would actually have been made in the U.S. It has become a very symbiotic relationship, and it has become an integrated economy in many ways and in many sectors, particularly in manufacturing. There, we see almost seamless integration in some companies, where production happens on both sides of the border. What it means is these economies, companies and industries are now not only intimately tied, but permanently tied at this point. Mexico’s positive future tied to the United States Mexico’s positive future is closely tied to the United States, in part because of this integration of production. If it does extend beyond the United States, it would most likely be through an expansion of what is already this North American production platform, through agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would expand Nafta beyond Canada and Mexico, to include other Latin American countries and many Asia Pacific countries. It is quite a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement, and one could see it expanding in production chains in many other countries that are participants, and sales would be going up. The U.S., for all of its hiccups in recent years, is still the largest market in the world, so being tied to the U.S. is not a bad thing at all. Recently, talk about a mega-agreement on trade between the world’s biggest trading bloc—the European Union—and the United States has surfaced. But it is not clear at all that this would hurt Mexico; it already has its own trade agreement with the EU and, on the other hand, there may be incentives to extend the EU-U.S. trade agreement to include other countries.

#### US is an integral part of Mexican manufacturing industry

Villarreal 8/9/12 – (M. Angeles, “U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications”, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf)//javi

Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been an integral part of the economic relationship between the United States and Mexico since NAFTA implementation. FDI consists of investments in real estate, manufacturing plants, and retail facilities, in which the foreign investor owns 10% or more of the entity. The United States is the largest source of FDI in Mexico. The stock of U.S. FDI increased from $17.0 billion in 1994 to $91.4 billion in 2011, a 440% increase (see Table 4). Mexican FDI in the United States is much lower than U.S. investment in Mexico, with levels of Mexican FDI fluctuating over the last 10 years. In 2010, Mexican FDI in the United States totaled $12.6 billion (see Table 4). The sharp rise in U.S. investment in Mexico since NAFTA is also a result of the liberalization of Mexico’s restrictions on foreign investment in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Prior to the mid-1980s, Mexico had a very protective policy that restricted foreign investment and controlled the exchange rate to encourage domestic growth, affecting the entire industrial sector. Mexico’s trade liberalization measures and economic reform in the late 1980s represented a sharp shift in policy and helped bring in a steady increase of FDI flows into Mexico. NAFTA provisions on foreign investment helped to lock in the reforms and increase investor confidence. Under NAFTA, Mexico gave U.S. and Canadian investors nondiscriminatory treatment of their investments as well as investor protection. NAFTA may have encouraged U.S. FDI in Mexico by increasing investor confidence, but much of the growth may have occurred anyway because Mexico likely would have continued to liberalize its foreign investment laws with or without the agreement. Nearly half of total FDI investment in Mexico is in the manufacturing industry, of which the maquiladora industry forms a major part. (See “Mexico’s Export-Oriented Assembly Plants” below.) In Mexico, the industry has helped attract investment from countries such as the United States that have a relatively large amount of capital. For the United States, the industry is important because U.S. companies are able to locate their labor-intensive operations in Mexico and lower their labor costs in the overall production process.

#### Mexican manufacturing key to US aerospace

Mecham 7/16 (Michael is apace writer for Gannett News, California Bureau Chief and correspondent for Congress, Aviation Week, 7/16/13, “Mexico’s Welcome Mat Attracts Aerospace Manufacturers”, <http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_04_01_2013_p44-562383.xml>\)

The aerospace influx has not happened overnight. Its roots date to the mid-1970s when U.S. companies, a mix of multinationals and lower-tier suppliers, began sending basic parts manufacturing and assembly tasks across the border, mostly to border towns like Tijuana and Mexicali but also deeper into the country to cities like Monterrey. Service operations followed, as did company research activities. However, it has been in the past decade that Mexico's aerospace manufacturing growth has mushroomed. Political reform led it to pursue a global free trade agenda vigorously and its 1994 signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) benefitted Mexico greatly. Still, it took about a decade for the aerospace sector to take off. Until 2004, growth was scattered, says Queretaro state Gov. Jose Calzada. Not anymore. “We've seen incredible changes in just the last five years,” he says The boom times are a testament to Mexico's geography, its embrace of free trade and adoption of legal mechanisms that provide a “soft landing” for foreign-owned factories. Local leaders clear red tape and amaze U.S. and European executives at how quickly they can put up factories. A typical response comes from Peter Huij, a senior Fokker Aerostructures executive in Chihuahua, about how quickly the company went from bare earth in May 2011 to a completed 75,000-sq.-ft. factory in November: “It would be impossible in Europe.” Behind all of this is Mexico's Maquiladora factory system for supporting foreign companies, which allows them to control their own destiny, importing raw materials such as aerospace-quality alloys, or wiring and then exporting the finished product tax-free. Foreign manufacturers commonly turn to a large service provider—Intermex and American Industries Group are leaders for the aerospace sector—that lease buildings to their clients and handle their human resources, tax and other business needs under Mexican law. About 80% of the aerospace companies in Mexico use such services. Of the 36 Maquiladoras registered by the Mexican government last year, six were in aerospace, including a GKN Aerospace plant in Mexicali, Latecoere in Hermosillo, coatings specialist Ellison Surface Technologies and Rolls-Royce turbine supplier JJ Churchill in Guaymas and a fourth division for Zodiac in Chihuahua. Under the Maquiladora system, Mexico allows resident foreign companies to control 100% of their businesses. They do not face the “local partner” rules so common elsewhere that limit foreigners to a maximum 49% share “They make it easy for you to do business down here,” says John Gardner, strategic program manager at Kaman Aerostructures, another newcomer in Chihuahua. “They provide a 'soft landing,' to get a quick startup—a good startup. We got a lot of support up front and afterward.”

#### US free trade is key to Mexican manufacturing and aerospace

Ryder 10 – (“Mexico Takes Flight”, Inbound Logistics, June 2010, http://www.ryder.com/en/supply-chain/solutions-by-industry/~/media/Ryder/Files/KnowledgeCenter/WhitePapers/RSC345Mexico%20Takes%20FlightIBLLowResEprintsingle.pdf)//javi

Among the many attractions that draw aerospace companies to Mexico, the cost of labor is a major factor. Highly skilled workers in Mexico’s aerospace industry earn from $5.80 to $7.80 an hour. Mexico is the lowest-cost choice for U.S. companies that outsource manufacturing abroad, surpassing India, China, and Vietnam, according to a report released this year by AlixPartners. Companies can easily ship products and components to Mexico from their plants in the United States or Canada for final assembly, or ship finished products to customers throughout North America. “You’re talking hours and days, rather than weeks, for transit to the United States,” says Jim Moore, vice president of sales for the aerospace, automotive and industrials vertical at Ryder Supply Chain Solutions. “You can ship on Thursday morning by truck and deliver on Monday.” Having targeted aerospace as a strategic growth industry, the Mexican government is doing its best to make the country an attractive environment for this sector. One of the most important incentives is the maquila system, which has prompted many North American manufacturers, in a variety of industries, to “nearshore” their production in Mexico. Maquilas are factories that operate in free trade zones. Companies import materials and equipment to those locations without paying taxes or duties, then reexport the finished products. Often, the manufactured goods are components that are shipped to factories outside Mexico for final assembly in products such as aircraft, automobiles, and computers. But even outside the maquila zones, parts and materials for use in aerospace manufacturing enjoy special tariff treatment, entering the country duty-free, says Ricardo Alvarez, director of business development for the aerospace, automotive and industrials vertical at Ryder Supply Chain Solutions. “Also, the value-added tax (VAT) is refundable after five days of the import process,” he notes. Mexico’s federal and state governments have established a variety of other tax incentives for the aerospace industry. In fact, from 2006 to 2008–a time when Mexico had eliminated incentives for many manufacturing sectors–it retained its incentives for aerospace. These included capital equipment grants, help with infrastructure, real estate grants, and the establishment of an Aerospace Training Center in Querétaro. FEMIA, an association of 48 aerospace manufacturers operating in Mexico, works with the federal and state governments to promote the interests of the industry. One of FEMIA’s goals is to develop a National Strategic Aerospace Plan.

#### Mexican aerospace is key to US aerospace investments

Taylor 13 (Guy, “Aerospace: An Emerging Mexican Industry”, Americas Quarterly, Winter, http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/aerospace-emerging-mexican-industry)

What began as an initial push into Mexico by U.S. manufacturers such as General Electric during the years following the 1994 enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement has now emerged as one of the nation’s most vibrant sectors. With 30,000 Mexicans now employed in aerospace factories across 16 of the nation’s 31 states, Mexican government investment in the sector is also growing—most measurably through the establishment of training schools and new university programs aimed at delivering a future crop of homegrown aerospace workers, plant managers and possibly even designers. The nation graduated more engineers per capita than Germany in 2012. While the states of Querétaro and Baja California make up the majority of aerospace production in Mexico, recent developments in Chihuahua City deserve a closer look. Ford Motor Company opened a factory in 1983 and has since built nearly 7 million truck engines. Thirty-six aerospace parts factories have opened in Chihuahua City over the past five years. A recent reporting trip there revealed that the vast majority of the factories are not Mexican-owned—which makes Mexico’s aerospace market unique in the hemisphere. The downside of this is that the country may be used increasingly for its cheap labor by profit-hungry companies from more established markets. But the upside finds Mexico emerging as a new center of globalization. A variety of international companies have recently opened new plants in Chihuahua City: U.S.-based supplier Nordam, which makes everything from airplane windows to cockpit doors; France-based Manior Aerospace, which cuts shiny precision-shaped steel discs that end up on Boeing commercial jets; and Netherlands-based Fokker Technologies.

#### Aerospace decline causes global instability and great power war

Pfaltzgraff 10 – Robert L, Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies at. The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, et al., Final Report of the IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy and Policy, “Air, Space, & Cyberspace Power in the 21st-Century”, p. xiii-9

Deterrence Strategy In stark contrast to the bipolar Cold War nuclear setting, today’s security environment includes multiple, independent nuclear actors. Some of these independent nuclear weapons states are potential adversaries, some are rivals, and some are friends, but the initial decision for action by any one of them may lie beyond U.S. control. The United States may need to influence, signal, and restrain enemies, and it may need to continue to provide security guarantees to non-nuclear friends and allies. America may also face catalytic warfare, where, for example, a U.S. ally such as Israel or a third party such as China could initiate action that might escalate to a nuclear exchange. Although the United States would not be a party to the nuclear escalation decision process, it could be drawn into the conflict. Compared to a bipolar world, very little is known about strategic nuclear interaction and escalation in a multipolar world. The U.S. nuclear deterrent must restrain a wider variety of actors today than during the Cold War. This requires a range of capabilities and the capacity to address specific challenges. The deterrent must provide security guarantees and assurance sufficient to prevent the initiation of catalytic warfare by an ally, while deterring an adversary from resorting to nuclear escalation. America may also need simultaneously to deter more than one other nuclear state. Deterrence requirements include four critical elements: early warning, C2, delivery systems, and weapons. The Air Force plays an indispensable role in furnishing the U.S. early warning system in its entirety through satellites and radar networks. In command and control, infrastructure is provided by the Air Force, including Milstar satellites and, in the future, advanced extremely high frequency (AEHF) satellites. In the area of delivery systems and weapons, two-thirds of the strategic triad – intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and bombers – is furnished by the Air Force and its Global Strike Command. U.S. Overseas Basing and the Anti-Access/Area-Denial Threat The increased availability of anti-access/area-denial assets coupled with growing threats to the sea, air, space, and cyberspace commons are challenging the power projection capabilities of the United States. These threats, in the form of aircraft and long-range missiles carrying conventional or nuclear munitions, present problems for our overseas bases. States such as North Korea, China, and Iran jeopardize the notion that forward-deployed U.S. forces and bases will be safe from enemy attack. Consequently, the United States must create a more flexible basing structure encompassing a passive and active defense posture that includes these features: dispersal, hardening, increased warning time of attack, and air defenses. Simultaneously, the United States must continue to develop long-range, offensive systems such as low-observable manned and remotely piloted strike aircraft, precision missiles, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms to penetrate heavily defended A2/AD environments. This approach will increase the survivability of U.S. forward-deployed assets and power projection capabilities and thus bolster deterrence and U.S. guarantees to America’s allies and friends. Asymmetric Challenges The increasing number of actors gaining access to advanced and dual-use technologies augments the potential for asymmetric attacks against the United States and its allies by those who are unable to match U.S. military capabilities. Those actors pose increasing challenges to the ability of the United States to project power through the global commons. Such attacks could target specific U.S. vulnerabilities, ranging from space assets to the financial, transportation, communications, and/or energy infrastructures, and to the food and water supply, to mention only the most obvious. Asymmetric attacks denying access to critical networks and capabilities may be the most cost-effective approach to circumventing traditional U.S. force advantages. The USAF and DoD must develop systems and technologies that can offset and defend against asymmetric capabilities. This will require a robust R&D program and enhanced USAF cooperation with its sister services and international partners and allies. Space Dominance Space is increasingly a contested domain where U.S. dominance is no longer assured given the growing number of actors in space and the potential for kinetic and non-kinetic attacks, including ASAT weapons, EMP, and jamming. As a result, the United States must protect vital space-based platforms and networks by reducing their vulnerability to attack or disruption and increasing the country’s resilience if an attack does occur. Required steps include hardening and incorporating stealth into next generation space systems and developing rapid replenishment capacity (including micro-satellite technologies and systems and new launch capabilities). At the same time, America must reduce its dependence on space capabilities with air-based substitutes such as high altitude, long endurance, and penetrating ISR platforms. Increased cooperation among the services and with U.S. allies to develop such capabilities will also be paramount. Cyber Security Cyber operations are vital to conducting USAF and joint land, sea, air, and space missions. Given the significance of the cyber threat (private, public, and DoD cyber and information networks are routinely under attack), the United States is attempting to construct a layered and robust capability to detect and mitigate cyber intrusions and attacks. The USAF’s cyber operations must be capable of operating in a contested cyber domain to support vital land, sea, air, and space missions. USAF cyberspace priorities include developing capabilities to protect essential military cyber systems and to speed their recovery if an attack does occur; enhancing the Air Force’s capacity to provide USAF personnel with the resolution of technical questions; and training/recruitment of personnel with cyber skills. In addition, the USAF and DoD need to develop technologies that quickly and precisely attribute attacks in cyberspace. Cyber attacks can spread quickly among networks, making it extremely difficult to attribute their perpetrator, and therefore to develop a deterrence strategy based on retaliation. In addition, some cyber issues are in the legal arena, including questions about civil liberties. It is likely that the trend of increased military support to civil authorities (for example, in disaster relief operations) will develop in the cyber arena as well. These efforts will entail greater service, interagency, international, and private-sector collaboration. Organizational Change and Joint Force Operations To address growing national security challenges and increasing fiscal constraints, and to become more effective, the joint force needs to adapt its organizations and processes to the exigencies of the information age and the security setting of the second decade of the twenty-first century. This entails developing a strategy that places increased emphasis on joint operations in which each service acts in greater concert with the others, leverages capacities across the services (two land services, three naval services, and five air services) without duplicating efforts, and encourages interoperability. This would provide combatant commanders (CCDRs) with a greater range of capabilities, allowing heightened flexibility to use force. A good example of this approach is the Air-Sea Battle concept being developed jointly by the Air Force and Navy, which envisions heightened cooperation between the two services and potentially with allies and coalition partners. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Capabilities There is an increasing demand for ISR capabilities able to access and persist in contested airspace in order to track a range of high-value mobile and hard-to-find targets, such as missile launchers and underground bunkers. This increases the need for stealthy, survivable systems and the development of next-generation unmanned platforms. The USAF must continue to emphasize precision targeting, both for strike and close-air-support missions. High-fidelity target identification and discrimination enabled by advanced radars and directed-energy systems, including the ability to find, track, and target individuals within a crowd, will provide battlefield commanders with improved options and new opportunities for leveraging joint assets. Engagement and International Security Cooperation Allies and coalition partners bring important capabilities from which the USAF and other services have long benefited. For example, allies and coalition partners can provide enhanced situational awareness and early warning of impending crises as well as assist in understanding the interests, motivations, traditions, and cultures of potential adversaries and prospective coalition partners. Moreover, foreign partner engagement and outreach are an avenue to influence partner and adversary perspectives, thus shaping the environment in ways favorable to U.S. national security interests. Engagement also may be a key to realizing another Air Force and joint priority: to sustain or gain access to forward operating bases and logistical infrastructure. This is particularly important given the growing availability of A2/AD assets and their ability to impede U.S. power projection capabilities. Procurement Choices and Affordability The USAF needs to field capabilities to support current operations and pressing missions while at the same time pursuing promising technologies to build the force of the future. Affordability, effectiveness, time urgency, and industrial base issues inevitably shape procurement choices and reform. The Air Force must maintain today’s critical assets while also allocating resources to meet future needs. Given the long lifespan anticipated for many weapon systems, planners need to make the most reliable cost estimates and identify problems at the outset of a weapons system’s development phase so that they can be corrected as early and cost-effectively as possible. Support to Civil Authorities As evidenced in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquakes in Haiti and Chile (the Chile earthquake hit after this conference), the USAF has a vital role to play in the U.S. response to international relief operations and support to civil authorities. In Haiti, the USAF reopened the airport and deployed contingency response elements, while also providing ISR support for the joint forces in the theater. In Chile, USAF satellite communication capabilities were critical to the recovery and relief efforts. USAF civil support roles are likely to grow to include greater use of the Reserve Components. Consequently, USAF planners should reassess the active and reserve component mix of forces and capabilities to identify potential mobilization and requirement shortfalls. CLOSING CONFERENCE THOUGHTS A recurring conference theme was the need for the USAF to continue to examine specific issues of opportunity and vulnerability more closely. For example, a future initiative could include focused working groups that would examine such questions and issues as: • How can air, space, and cyberspace capabilities best support deterrence, preserve U.S. freedom of action, and support national objectives? • How should the USAF leadership reconceptualize its vision, institutional identity, and force posture to align as closely as possible with the future national security setting? • What is the appropriate balance between high-end and low-end air and space capabilities that will maximize military options for national decision makers, given emerging threats and fiscal constraints? • What are the opportunities, options, and tradeoffs for investment and divestment in science and technology, infrastructure, and programmed capabilities? • What are additional interdependent concepts, similar to Air-Sea Battle, that leverage cross-service investments to identify and foster the development of new joint capabilities? • What are alternative approaches to officer accessions and development to support shifting and emerging Air Force missions, operations, and force structure, including cyber warfare? • How can the USAF best interact with Congress to help preserve or refocus the defense-industrial base as well as to minimize mandates and restrictions that weigh on future Air Force investments? Finally, the USAF must continue to be an organization that views debate, as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force put it in his opening conference address, “…as the whetstone upon which we sharpen our strategic thinking.” This debate must also be used in pursuit of political support and to ensure that the USAF maintains and develops critical capabilities to support U.S. national security priorities. The 38th IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy and Policy was conceived as a contribution to that debate. Almost a century has passed since the advent of airpower and Billy Mitchell’s demonstration of its operational potential with the sinking of the Ostfriesland on July 21, 1921. For most of that time, the United States has benefitted from the rapid development of air and space power projection capabilities, and, as a result, it has prevailed in successive conflicts, contributed to war deterrence and crisis management, and provided essential humanitarian relief to allies and friends around the world. As we move into the second decade of the twenty-first century, the U.S. Air Force (USAF), like its service counterparts, is re-assessing strategies, operational concepts, and force structure. Across the conflict spectrum, security challenges are evolving, and potential adversaries–state and non-state actors–are developing anti-access and other asymmetric capabilities, and irregular warfare challenges are becoming more prevalent. The potential exists for “hybrid” warfare in which state adversaries and/or non-state actors use a mix of conventional and unconventional capabilities against the United States, a possibility made more feasible by the diffusion of such capabilities to a larger number of actors. Furthermore, twenty-first-century security challenges and threats may emanate from highly adaptive adversaries who ignore the Geneva Conventions of war and use military and/or civilian technologies to offset our military superiority. As it develops strategy and force structure in this global setting, the Air Force confronts constraints that will have important implications for budget and procurement programs, basic research and development (R&D), and the maintenance of critical skills, as well as recruitment, education, training, and retention. Given the dynamic nature of the security setting and looming defense budget constraints, questions of where to assume risk will demand bold, innovative, and decisive leadership. The imperative for joint operations and U.S. military-civilian partnerships is clear, underscoring the need for a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach that encompasses international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). THE UNITED STATES AS AN AEROSPACE NATION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES In his address opening the conference, General Norton A. Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), pointed out how, with its inherent characteristics of speed, range, and flexibility, airpower has forever changed warfare. Its advent rendered land and maritime forces vulnerable from the air, thus adding an important new dimension to warfare. Control of the air has become indispensable to national security because it allows the United States and friendly forces to maneuver and operate free from enemy air attack. With control of the air the United States can leverage the advantages of air and space as well as cyberspace. In these interdependent domains the Air Force possesses unique capabilities for ensuring global mobility, long-range strike, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). The benefits of airpower extend beyond the air domain, and operations among the air, land, maritime, space, and cyber domains are increasingly interdependent. General Schwartz stated that the Air Force’s challenge is to succeed in a protracted struggle against elements of violent extremism and irreconcilable actors while confronting peer and near-peer rivals. The Air Force must be able to operate with great precision and lethality across a broad spectrum of conflict that has high and low ends but that defies an orderly taxonomy. Warfare in the twenty-first century takes on a hybrid complexity, with regular and irregular elements using myriad tools and tactics. Technology can be an enabler but can also create weaknesses: adversaries with increased access to space and cyberspace can use emerging technologies against the United States and/or its allies. In addition, the United States faces the prospect of the proliferation of precision weapons, including ballistic and cruise missiles as well as increasingly accurate mortars, rockets, and artillery, which will put U.S. and allied/coalition forces at risk. In response to mounting irregular warfare challenges American leaders have to adopt innovative and creative strategies. For its part, the USAF must develop airman who have the creativity to anticipate and plan for this challenging environment. Leadership, intellectual creativity, capacity, and ingenuity, together with innovative technology, will be crucial to addressing these challenges in a constrained fiscal environment. System Versatility In meeting the broad range of contingencies – high, low, regular, irregular, and hybrid – the Air Force must maintain and develop systems that are versatile, both functionally (including strike or ISR) and in terms of various employment modes, such as manned versus remotely piloted, and penetrating versus stand-off systems. General Schwartz emphasized the need to be able to operate in conflict settings where there will be demands for persistent ISR systems able to gain access to, and then loiter in, contested or denied airspace. The targets to be identified and tracked may be mobile or deeply buried, of high value, and difficult to locate without penetrating systems. General Schwartz also called attention to the need for what he described as a “family of systems” that could be deployed in multiple ways with maximum versatility depending on requirements. Few systems will remain inherently single purpose. Indeed, he emphasized that the Air Force must purposefully design versatility into its new systems, with the majority of future systems being able to operate in various threat environments. As part of this effort further joint integration and inter-service cooperation to achieve greater air-land and air-sea interoperability will continue to be a strategic necessity. Space Access and Control Space access, control, and situational awareness remain essential to U.S. national security. As potential rivals develop their own space programs, the United States faces challenges to its unrestricted access to space. Ensuring continuing access to the four global commons – maritime, air, space, and cyberspace – will be a major challenge in which the USAF has a key role. The Air Force has long recognized the importance of space and is endeavoring to make certain that U.S. requirements in and for space are met and anticipated. Space situational awareness is vital to America’s ability to help evaluate and attribute attacks. Attribution, of course, is essential to deterrence. The USAF is exploring options to reduce U.S. dependence on the Global Positioning System (GPS), which could become vulnerable to jamming. Promising new technologies, such as “cold atoms,” pseudolites, and imaging inertial navigation systems that use laser radar are being investigated as means to reduce our vulnerability. Cyber Capabilities The USAF continues to develop cyber capabilities to address opportunities and challenges. Cyber threats present challenges to homeland security and other national security interests. Key civilian and military networks are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Preparing for cyber warfare and refining critical infrastructure protection and consequence management will require new capabilities, focused training, and greater interagency, international, and private sector collaboration. Challenges for the Air Force General Schwartz set forth a series of challenges for the Air Force, which he urged conference participants to address. They included: • How can the Air Force better address the growing demand for real-time ISR from remotely piloted systems, which are providing unprecedented and unmatched situational awareness? • How can the USAF better guarantee the credibility and viability of the nation’s nuclear forces for the complex and uncertain security environment of this century? • What is the way ahead for the next generation of long-range strike and ISR platforms? What trade-offs, especially between manned and unmanned platforms, should the USAF consider? How can the USAF improve acquisition of such systems? How can the USAF better exploit the advantage of low-observables? • How can the Air Force better prepare itself to operate in an opposed network environment in which communications and data links will be challenged, including how to assure command and control (C2) in bandwidth-constrained environments? • In counter-land operations, how can the USAF achieve improved target discrimination in high collateral damage situations? • How should the USAF posture its overseas forces to ensure access? What basing structure, logistical considerations, andprotection measures are required to mitigate emerging anti-access threats? • How can the Air Force reduce its reliance on GPS to ensure operations in a GPS-denied environment? • How can the USAF lessen its vulnerability to petroleum shortages, rising energy prices, and resulting logistical and operational challenges? • How can the Air Force enhance partnerships with its sister services and the interagency community? How can it better collaborate with allies and coalition partners to improve support of national security interests? These issues were addressed in subsequent conference sessions. The opening session focused on the multidimensional and dynamic security setting in which the Air Force will operate in the years ahead. The session included a discussion of the need to prioritize necessary capabilities and to gauge “acceptable risks.” Previous Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) rested on the basic assumption that the United States would be able to support operations simultaneously or nearly simultaneously in two major regional contingencies, with the additional capacity to respond to smaller disaster-relief and/or stability operations missions. However, while the 2010 QDR1 maintains the need for U.S. forces to operate in two nearly simultaneous major wars, it places far greater emphasis on the need to address irregular warfare challenges. Its focus is maintaining and rebalancing U.S. force structure to fight the wars in which the United States is engaged today while looking ahead to the emerging security setting. The QDR further seeks to develop flexible and tailored capabilities to confront an array of smaller-scale contingencies, including natural disasters, perhaps simultaneously, as was the case with the war in Afghanistan, stability operations in Iraq, and the Haiti relief effort. The 2010 QDR highlights important trends in the global security environment, especially unconventional threats and asymmetric challenges. It suggests that a conflict with a near-peer competitor such as China, or a conflict with Iran, would involve a mix, or hybrid, of capabilities that would test U.S. forces in very different ways. Although predicting the future security setting is a very difficult if not an impossible exercise, the 2010 QDR outlines major challenges for the United States and its allies, including technology proliferation and diffusion; anti-access threats and the shrinking global basing infrastructure; the possibility of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) use against the U.S. homeland and/or against U.S. forces abroad; critical infrastructure protection and the massed effects of a cyber or space attack; unconventional warfare and irregular challenges; and the emergence of new issue areas such as Arctic security, U.S. energy dependence, demographic shifts and urbanization, the potential for resource wars (particularly over access to water), and the erosion or collapse of governance in weak or failing states. TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION Technology proliferation is accelerating. Compounding the problem is the reality that existing multilateral and/or international export regimes and controls have not kept pace with technology, and efforts to constrain access are complicated by dual-use technologies and chemical/biological agents. The battlefields of the future are likely to be more lethal as combatants take advantage of commercially based navigation aids for precision guidance and advanced weapons systems and as global and theater boundaries disappear with longer-range missile systems becoming more common in enemy arsenals. Non-state entities such as Hezbollah have already used more advanced missile systems to target state adversaries. The proliferation of precision technologies and longer-range delivery platforms puts the United States and its partners increasingly at risk. This proliferation also is likely to affect U.S. operations from forward operating locations, placing additional constraints on American force deployments within the territories of allies. Moreover, as longer-range ballistic and cruise missiles become more widespread, U.S. forces will find it increasingly difficult to operate in conflicts ranging from irregular warfare to high-intensity combat. As highlighted throughout the conference, this will require that the United States develop and field new-generation low-observable penetration assets and related capabilities to operate in non-permissive environments. PROLIFERATION TRENDS The twenty-first-century security setting features several proliferation trends that were discussed in the opening session. These trends, six of which were outlined by Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, framed subsequent discussions. First, the number of actors–states and armed non-state groups–is growing, together with strategies and capabilities based on more widely available technologies, including WMD and conventional weapons. This is leading to a blurring of categories of warfare that may include state and non-state actors and encompass intra-state, trans-state, and inter-state armed conflict as well as hybrid threats. Second, some of these actors subscribe to ideologies and goals that welcome martyrdom. This raises many questions about dissuasion and deterrence and the need to think of twenty-first-century deterrence based on offensive and defensive strategies and capabilities. Third, given the sheer numbers of actors capable of challenging the United States and their unprecedented capabilities, the opportunity for asymmetric operations against the United States and its allies will grow. The United States will need to work to reduce key areas of vulnerability, including its financial systems, transportation, communications, and energy infrastructures, its food and water supply, and its space assets. Fourth, the twenty-first-century world contains flashpoints for state-to-state conflict. This includes North Korea, which possesses nuclear weapons, and Iran, which is developing them. In addition, China is developing an impressive array of weaponry which, as the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command stated in congressional testimony, appears “designed to challenge U.S. freedom of action in the region and, if necessary, enforce China’s influence over its neighbors – including our regional allies and partners’ weaponry.”2 These threats include ballistic missiles, aircraft, naval forces, cyber capabilities, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, and other power-projection capabilities. The global paradigm of the twenty-first century is further complicated by state actors who may supply advanced arms to non-state actors and terrorist organizations. Fifth, the potential for irregular warfare is rising dramatically with the growth of armed non-state actors. The proliferation of more lethal capabilities, including WMD, to armed non-state actors is a logical projection of present trends. Substantial numbers of fractured, unstable, and ungoverned states serve as breeding grounds of armed non-state actors who will resort to various forms of violence and coercion based on irregular tactics and formations and who will increasingly have the capabilities to do so. Sixth, the twenty-first-century security setting contains yet another obvious dimension: the permeability of the frontiers of the nation state, rendering domestic populations highly vulnerable to destruction not only by states that can launch missiles but also by terrorists and other transnational groups. As we have seen in recent years, these entities can attack U.S. information systems, creating the possibility of a digital Pearl Harbor. Taken together, these trends show an unprecedented proliferation of actors and advanced capabilities confronting the United States; the resulting need to prepare for high-end and low-end conflict; and the requirement to think of a seamless web of threats and other security challenges extending from overseas to domestic locales. Another way to think about the twenty-first-century security setting, Dr. Pfaltzgraff pointed out, is to develop scenarios such as the following, which are more illustrative than comprehensive: • A nuclear Iran that engages in or supports terrorist operations in a more assertive foreign policy • An unstable Pakistan that loses control of its nuclear weapons, which fall into the hands of extremists • A Taiwan Straits crisis that escalates to war • A nuclear North Korea that escalates tensions on the Korean peninsula

What all of these have in common is the indispensable role that airpower would play in U.S. strategy and crisis management.

#### Aerospace key to hegemony

Lexington Institute 13

[Public policy think tank, “America Is A Superpower Because It Is An Air Power”, 1/24, <http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/142016/air-power-makes-america-a-superpower.html>] \*we don’t defend the gendered discourse of this evidence

There is no question that the United States has the best military in the world. The United States is unique in its ability to project military power to multiple regions of the world simultaneously, conduct multiple major combined and joint operations at a time and both defend the homeland and provide ongoing support to civil agencies. Europe, which spends about sixty percent of the U.S. defense budget and actually has more man and woman in uniform, was unable without significant U.S. support to conduct a single, modest campaign in Libya. The U.S. military continues to set the world standard with respect to most major military systems: nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, large deck amphibious warfare ships, nuclear attack submarines, strategic bombers, fifth-generation fighters, air and missile defenses, tanks and armored fighting vehicles and space and airborne ISR. Even though we don’t talk much about it the military’s cyber warfare capabilities are truly impressive. While the U.S. has the best ground, naval and amphibious forces in the world, one thing makes it a 21st Century superpower: its dominance as an air power. The United States alone is capable of deploying its aerial assets anywhere in the world. U.S. air power can hold at risk any target set in any country and can do so from multiple directions. The U.S. Air Force is the only one capable of delivering specially-designed conventional bombs large enough to destroy deeply buried and hardened structures.  Over the past two decades, the U.S. military has repeatedly demonstrated that it can destroy an adversary’s air force and air defenses in a matter of weeks. After that, hostile ground units were toast. The ability to rapidly seize control of the air means that no soldier has died in an air attack since 1953. Over a decade of wars, American air power from the land and sea provided continual responsive fire support for tactical units on the ground. Other nations have fighters and bombers, although America’s are the best. The U.S. also has the largest and most capable fleets of air transports, refueling aircraft and airborne ISR assets in the world. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Air Force flew soldiers and heavy armor deep into Iraq to seize a critical target, the Haditha Dam. Since 2001, the Air Force has maintained a continuous air bridge to Afghanistan, more than 8,000 miles from CONUS. U.S. C-17 transports are today flying French troops and equipment into Mali. The U.S. Navy has a fleet of fixed wing transports, the C-2 Greyhounds, specifically for the purpose of moving parts and people to and from its aircraft carriers. The United States has crafted an ISR and strategic warning capability based on a sophisticated array of satellites, manned platforms and unmanned aerial systems.  Dominant air power is about much more than just platforms and weapons. It requires also the trained people and processes to plan and manage air operations, process, exploit and disseminate intelligence, identify targets and plan attacks, move supplies and route transports and repair and maintain complex systems. The U.S. had to send hundreds of targeteers to NATO to support the Libyan operation. Over decades, the U.S. military has developed an unequalled training establishment and set of ranges that ensure the highest quality pilots and other personnel. Finally, the U.S. is the dominant air power in the world because of its aerospace industrial base. Whether it is designing and producing fifth-generation fighters such as the F-22 and F-35, providing an advanced tanker like the new KC-46 or inventing high-flying unmanned aerial systems like the Global Hawk, the U.S. aerospace industry continues to set the bar. In addition, the private and public parts of the aerospace industrial base, often working together based on collaborative arrangements such as performance-based logistics contracts, is able to move aircraft, weapons and systems through the nationwide system of depots, Air Logistics Centers and other facilities at a rate unmatched by any other nation. The ability to rapidly repair or overhaul aircraft is itself a force multiplier, providing more aircraft on the flight line to support the warfighters. The U.S. military can go where it is ordered, respond rapidly to the crisis of the moment, move men, equipment and supplies around the world and dominate any place on the face of the earth as long as it desires because it is dominant in the air. As the Pentagon, Congress and the White House struggle with budget issues that could well require deep cuts to the military, they would be well advised to remember that it is air dominance that enables this country to remain a superpower.

#### The pursuit of hegemony is inevitable, sustainable, and prevents great power war

**Ikenberry, Brooks, and Wohlforth 13** – \*Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, \*\*John Ikenberry is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, \*\*William C. Wohlforth is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College (“Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement”, January/February 2013, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138468/stephen-g-brooks-g-john-ikenberry-and-william-c-wohlforth/lean-forward)

Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states. Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier. But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington--notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia--might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas. There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East--but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up. The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world s key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as A percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals .is by many measures growing. On top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony--China--and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing. MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the current grand strategy miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the country's military dominance undergirds its economic leadership. In addition to protecting the world economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply. Were the United States to pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open. A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred--convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship." More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States. The United States' geopolitical dominance also helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country, such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU'S dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk. CREATING COOPERATION What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability. U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds." THE DEVIL WE KNOW Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes--a view that seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments simply don't hold up. There is little evidence that the United States would save much money switching to a smaller global posture. Nor is the current strategy self-defeating: it has not provoked the formation of counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself into economic decline. Nor will it condemn the United States to foolhardy wars in the future. What the strategy does do is help prevent the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global economy humming, and make international cooperation easier. Charting a different course would threaten all these benefits. This is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power, and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world. A grand strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States exceptionally well for the past six decades, and there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know. Were American leaders to choose retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world would work without an engaged and liberal leading power. The results could well be disastrous.

#### Mexican economic collapse causes instability

**Barnes 11** – (4/29/11, Joe, Bonner Means Baker Fellow James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy Rice University, “Oil and U.S.-Mexico Bilateral Relations,” <http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-BarnesBilateral-04292011.pdf>)

There is already a short- to medium-term risk of substantial instability in Mexico.  As noted, the country is enduring extremely high levels of drug-related violence.  Even if the Mexican government eventually succeeds in its efforts to suppress this violence, the process is likely to be expensive, bloody, and corrosive in terms of human rights.  A period of feeble economic growth, combined with a fiscal crisis associated with a drop in revenues from Pemex, could create a “perfect storm” south of the border.   If this were to occur, Washington would have no choice but to respond.  In the longer-term, the United States has a clear interest in robust economic growth and fiscal sustainability in Mexico.  There is at least one major example of the U.S. coming to Mexico’s aid in an economic emergency.  In 1994, the United States extended US$20 billion in loan guarantees to Mexico when the peso collapsed, in large part to make U.S. creditors whole.  Not least, a healthy Mexican economy would reduce the flow of illegal immigration to the United States.  To the extent that prospects for such growth and sustainability are enhanced by reform of Pemex, the United States should be supportive.  It might be best, in terms of U.S. economic and commercial interests, were Pemex to be fully privatized, but even partial reforms would be welcome.  Not all national oil companies are created equal: Pemex’s development into something like Norway’s Statol would mark an important improvement.

#### That tanks the global economy

**Rangel 95**, Enrique Rangel, fellow at the Monterrey Bureau, “Pressure on the Peso,” November 28th, 1995, from The Dallas Morning News, lexis

All year long, thousands of foreign investors have nervously watched Mexico’s volatile financial markets as the Clinton administration and congressional leaders debated the pros and cons of bailing out a battered currency. With the exception of 1982 - when Mexico defaulted on its foreign debt and a handful of giant New York banks worried they would lose billions of dollars in loans - few people abroad ever cared about a weak peso. But now it’s different, experts say. This time, the world is keeping a close eye on Mexico’s unfolding financial crisis for one simple reason: Mexico is a major international player. If its economy were to collapse, it would drag down a few other countries and thousands of foreign investors. If recovery is prolonged, the world economy will feel the slowdown. “It took a peso devaluation so that other countries could notice the key role that Mexico plays in today’s global economy,” said economist Victor Lopez Villafane of the Monterrey Institute of Technology. “I hate to say it, but if Mexico were to default on its debts, that would trigger an international financial collapse” not seen since the Great Depression, said Dr. Lopez, who has conducted comparative studies of the Mexican economy and the economies of some Asian and Latin American countries. “That’s why it’s in the best interests of the United States and the industrialized world to help Mexico weather its economic crisis,” he said. The crisis began last December when the Mexican government devalued the currency. Last March, after weeks of debate, President Clinton, the International Monetary Fund and a handful of other countries and international agencies put together a $ 53 billion rescue package for Mexico. But despite the help - $ 20 billion in guarantee loans from the United States - Mexico’s financial markets have been volatile for most of the year. The peso is now trading at about 7.70 to the dollar, after falling to an all-time low of 8.30 to the dollar Nov. 9. The road has been bumpy, and that has made many - particularly U.S. investors - nervous. No country understands better the importance of Mexico to the global economy than the United States, said Jorge Gonzalez Davila, an economist at Trinity University in San Antonio. “Despite the rhetoric that you hear in Washington, I think that most people agree - even those who oppose any aid to Mexico - that when Mexico sneezes, everybody catches a cold,” Mr. Gonzalez said. “That’s why nowadays any talk of aid to Mexico or trade with Mexico gets a lot of attention,” he said. Most economists, analysts and business leaders on both sides of the border agree that the biggest impact abroad of a prolonged Mexican fiscal crisis may be on the U.S. economy, especially in Texas and in cities bordering Mexico.

#### Global economic decline causes nuclear war

Auslin ‘9

(Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman – Resident Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3-6, http://www.aei.org/article/100187)

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang.

### EU Relations

#### Contention 2 is EU Relations

#### Negotiations with Mexico are necessary to the success of TTIP

Knigge 2/26/13 – (Michael, “EU-US trade deal is 'unique opportunity'”, DW, http://www.dw.de/eu-us-trade-deal-is-unique-opportunity/a-16584523?maca=en-rss-en-top-1022-rdf)//javi

Experts are skeptical as to whether such an agreement can ever be reached. They point to similar visions of free, transatlantic trade from the past that fizzled out in the political chambers of Washington and Brussels. After the multi-year and ultimately fruitless worldwide trade deal called the Doha Development Agenda failed in 2008, Washington is also tired of endless discussion. In order to gauge the seriousness of Europeans on the matter, the Obama administration has recently been anxious for a clear signal from Brussels. Yet even if the EU and US begin negotiations in the coming months, success is anything but assured. Negotiators from both the US government and the EU Commission will not be free to negotiate as they please. Without the ultimate approval of US Congress and the EU Parliament, there will be no agreement. Other countries, such as Turkey, which has a customs agreement with the EU, or Canada and Mexico, which are linked to US trade through NAFTA, will at the very least have to play an informal role in future negotiations.

#### TTIP failure hurts US-EU trade ties and relations

Llana 7/8/13 – (Sara Miller, “Will US-EU trade talks spur growth - or show globalization's limits?”, CSM, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2013/0708/Will-US-EU-trade-talks-spur-growth-or-show-globalization-s-limits)//javi

Yet even if it fails – and there are plenty who think that the obstacles such as agriculture and, most recently, data privacy are insurmountable – a failure would be pivotal, showing that tariffs can be dropped but non-tariff barriers, which are often more cultural in nature, remain stubborn. A failure, says Fredrik Erixon, the director of the European Center for International Political Economy (ECIPE) in Brussels, “could lead to a larger standstill in efforts to address 21st century trade barriers.” Long-standing obstacles Tariffs between the US and EU are already relatively low, but because of the sheer size of trade between the two – representing half of global economic output – advocates say it would be a major booster of growth and jobs, especially in debt-stricken Europe that has seen record high unemployment at 12.2 percent. The two already invest nearly $4 trillion in each other’s economies, according to US statistics, which translates into 7 million jobs. It’s the non-tariff barriers, however, that most are watching in TTIP talks. Today, if a product is made in France, for example, it goes through the various regulatory hurdles to bring it to the marketplace; it then has to go through another set of strenuous – and often redundant – hurdles to reach the US market. Under the TTIP, both sides could agree to mutually recognize the others’ systems. When it comes to car safety, reducing red tape may be an easy compromise. But other issues on the table have long vexed negotiators. That includes French subsidies for its film industry, European resistance to genetically modified foods (GMOs), or data privacy laws – especially in the wake of the information released by former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden revealing the US systematically spies on its own citizens, as well as European institutions. “One of the sleeper issues in the deal is how to deal with privacy,” says Bruce Stokes, the director of the Global Economic Attitudes program at the Pew Research Center. Europeans, particularly Germans, are far more sensitive than Americans when it comes to data privacy. “There is a disconnect between Europeans and Americans about this new digital economy,” Mr. Stokes says. And even if the Snowden case is about government, not industry, it bolsters European assumptions that Americans don’t care about privacy, he says. Supporters of the agreement know these talks will be arduous, but at a time of economic weakness, they might have the political will to push forward. “Europe is stuck, and the US is also stuck, although not quite as bad,” says Thomas Wright, a fellow in the Managing Global Order project at the Brookings Institution. “This offers a way that leaders can be proactive and generate growth. I think that resonates with people, particularly in Europe.” Mr. Erixon also says that regulators in specific industries have more of an incentive to find solutions now, because their refusal to compromise would influence every other industry included in the talks. On the issue of the US using chlorine when washing chicken, for example, compromise has been impossible because the context was always too small. “Regulators were trying to defend their position, with no interest at all in participating in negotiations with other countries,” he says. “If you play filibuster now, the cost is higher.” 'Cultural exceptions' – and similarities So far TTIP has not generated widespread controversy in the US. That might be because it’s still early days. But it’s also because of the nature of the deal, says Charles Kupchan, a transatlantic expert at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington. “Since trade is relatively free and since [the US] and the EU are at similar stages of development, this is not a deal that is going to cause major dislocation,” he says. “This is an easier sell politically.” Opposition might be stronger on the European side. Already the French sought to invoke the so-called “cultural exception” in the talks, as a way to protect its movie industry from an incursion from Hollywood. France ultimately agreed to allow media to be included in talks so that they could officially launch, but it will be among the most difficult issues to negotiate. “It’s not a little issue. It’s the cultural meat of a nation,” says Josef Braml, transatlantic expert at the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin, who has little hope that a deal is attainable – above all, he says, because of the weakness of President Obama. But the “cultural exception” debate could be a harbinger of sentiments that develop as the trade talks get underway. Guillaume Xavier-Bender of the German Marshall Fund of the US in Brussels says that in many ways the talks will show how similar regulations between Europe and the US are. “There are more things in common between Europeans and Americans than there are differences,” he says. But on the politically most sensitive issues, claims that TTIP is merely an American instrument to change European values could be made. “It is possible in Europe you see anti-globalization and anti-liberalization movements evolve into anti-Americanism,” he says. If an agreement becomes impossible to forge, it may ultimately illustrate more than transatlantic differences. Mr. Stokes says that global economies have continuously become more closely integrated over time. But if in the TTIP it’s possible to get rid of tariffs yet not non-tariff barriers, he says it will be telling for the future of trade agreements globally – a sign, he says, that “we may be encountering the edges of the limits of globalization.”

#### EU says yes

COG 3/3/08 – (Bob Thiel, “A Combined EU & North American Trade Block Coming?”, Church of God News, http://www.cogwriter.com/news/prophecy/a-combined-eu-north-american-trade-block-coming/)//javi

Fifty-five U.S. Senators and Congressman currently serve as advisors to a “working group” for the Transatlantic Common Market between the U.S. and the European Union. “An economist from the World Bank has argued in print that the formation of the Transatlantic Common Market is designed to follow the blueprint of Jean Monet, a key intellectual architect of the European Union, recognizing that economic integration must inevitably lead to political integration.” The idea of this union came to light in April 2007, when President Bush, German Chancellor Merkel, and European Commission President Barroso launched the Transatlantic Economic Council. Efforts are already underway to create a North American Community, including the U.S., Mexico and Canada. This community is to be based on security and economic issues and is intended to be in place by 2010 (WorldNetDaily.com, July 20, 2005; September 25, 2006). The Transatlantic Common Market is intended to combine the North American Community with the EU, creating the world’s most formidable trade bloc—a trade bloc that would be so large that its trading policies would automatically become policies for the world. Plans for this new “common market” are proceeding and are intended to pass through in a “treaty” form, much like the most recent EU Treaty, in order to avoid the scrutiny and debate that often come with more “formal” agreements (January 16, 2008). Revelation 18 warns of a future Beast, known as Babylon the Great, through which “the merchants of the earth have become rich through the abundance of her luxury” (v. 3). I have been expecting such a development for some time. And today, I would like to explain what I have believed for over 20 years will most likely happen with the above proposed trade block. Negotiations will continue and some type of loose agreements will happen. In the spirit of accommodation and personal interest, many of the “standards” of the European Union will be adopted by the USA, Canada and Mexico, as well as by nearly all of the countries of the world. The Arab nations will most likely agree with many of the standards as they seem to be destined to form a brief end-time alliance with the Europeans (The Arab World In the Bible, History, and Prophecy).

#### Decline in US-EU relations causes Protectionism

C. Fred Bergsten 99, Director, Institute for International Economics, “America and Europe: Clash of the Titans?” FOREIGN AFFAIRS v. 78 n. 2, March/April 1999, p. 20+, LN.

Both sides now run the risk of drift and even paralysis in transatlantic trade policy -- with potentially severe repercussions for the rest of the world. A slide into protectionism or even a failure to continue opening new markets would have a major impact on the global trading system. Could we then expect Asian economies, who depend on expanded exports to emerge from their deep recessions, to keep their own markets open? Would the transition economies in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Asia stick to their liberalization strategies? With the backlash against globalization already evident everywhere, the ominous inward-looking protectionist and nationalistic policies that the world has rejected so decisively could reemerge once again. A failure of transatlantic leadership would make such policy reversals particularly likely. The United States and the EU are the only economic superpowers and the only two regions enjoying reasonable economic growth. They created the GATT system and, more recently, the WTO. Despite their own occasional transgressions, they have nurtured and defended the system throughout its evolution over the past 50 years. While Japan has been important on a few issues and the developing countries played an encouraging role in the Uruguay Round, the Atlantic powers built and sustained the world trade order. Their failure to maintain that commitment would devastate the entire regime.

#### Causes large scale military confrontations

Panzer 8 (Michael J., Faculty – New York Institute of Finance, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, p. 137-138)

The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientists at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

#### US-EU relations key to allowing negotiations with Iran about its nuclear program

Peterson et Al. 9/11/13 [John Peterson - Chair of International Politics at the University of Edinburgh, Riccardo Alcaro - IAI's Transatlantic Programme, Riccardo Alcaro is co-coordinator of the 7th Framework Programme-funded Transworld project on the future of the transatlantic relationship and its role in the world; he is responsible for the organization of the annual Transatlantic Security Symposium on the security priorities debated by the transatlantic partners. He is a fellow of the EU-wide programme European Foreign and Security Policy Studies, and Nathalie Tocci - Senior Fellow at the Transatlantic Academy, “MULTIPOLARITY AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: Multilateralism and Leadership in a New International Order”, P. 15-18, Accessed: 9/17/13]

Above all, the NTA has helped the transatlantic relationship keep pace with the emergence of Brussels as a political capital. The Brussels-Washington “channel” in transatlantic relations has gained in importance in past decades over others, including NATO and the various bilateral channels between Washington and national European capitals (including London and Berlin). US officials or commentators concerned with individual policy sectors or areas of the world are exceptions to the rule about American ignorance of the EU. To illustrate, analysts of the politics of Iran’s nuclear programme concede that “[t]he Europeans have been the unsung heroes in pressing Iran with their embargo on the import of Iranian oil” (Middle East Institute 2012). The embargo caused genuine pain to southern EU member states already in serious economic difficulties. But it also ratcheted up the pressure on Teheran – posing genuine economic hardship on Iran – in a way that made the West seem like a collective. On the economic front, trade specialists and economists regularly acknowledge the importance of the Union both as the world’s largest trading power and by far America’s most important economic partner (see Hamilton and Quinlan 2013). Toje (2008: 144) notes that “American decision-makers do take the European Union very seriously in matters of trade and economy.” An exemplary instance was the 2011 NTA summit that yielded an agreement to create a bilateral High Level Working on Jobs and Growth to tackle an ambitious cooperative economic policy agenda. There is sufficient “low-hanging fruit” in the form of economic gains for both sides to justify an ambitious US-EU economic cooperation agreement. Two separate studies suggested that greater gains for the US were available from a US-EU deal than from the Trans-Pacific Partnership it was pursuing in Asia (see Stokes 2013). Obama’s 2013 State of the Union address featured clear investment of political will in the initiative from the highest political level: “tonight I am announcing that we will launch talks on a comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the European Union – because trade that is free and fair across the Atlantic supports millions of good-paying American jobs.” Hence, the institutions that bind the West together appear relatively robust. Moreover, new forces in the emerging international order can be interpreted, plausibly, as pushing the US and EU towards each other. One is the rise of China. The Obama administration’s “Asian pivot” signalled a fundamental shift in America’s geopolitical focus towards Asia and away from Europe. Collective transatlantic action on China will inevitably face obstacles as the US and Europe each try to curry favour with China and seek access to its fast-growing markets. But both Washington and European national capitals – not least Brussels – share an interest in encouraging Beijing to settle disputes with other Asian capitals over islands and territory in the region peacefully and, above all, to become a responsible international economic actor. Another change that, on balance, may encourage collective transatlantic action is Russia’s emergence as a “pole.” European reliance on Russian energy supplies makes confrontation a decidedly unappealing option for most EU member states, which are naturally inclined to seek some form of modus vivendi with their difficult neighbour (David et al. 2013). The US has no such concerns and is therefore less restrained in criticizing Moscow for its poor human rights record or signalling that Georgia and Ukraine might become NATO members, as the Bush administration did (recklessly), provoking deep resentment in the Kremlin. Yet, the US has its own interest in engaging Russia in ways that make it a responsible geopolitical player in its near abroad and something like a normal trading power as a WTO member. A perhaps less obvious source of common transatlantic cause is the rise of India. The incentives for the US and Europe jointly to encourage New Delhi to be a help and not a hindrance on all things “AfPak” (Afghanistan and Pakistan) are clear. Only slightly less so is shared motivation to prod India – a country where trade ministers are garlanded when they return home from a WTO summit after scuppering a deal – towards wielding its economic power in ways that are not cynical and self-centred, as well as to develop its way out of its grinding poverty. At the same time, forces exist that strain the West. There is no question that Europe – leaving aside the euro crisis – has slid down the list of American geopolitical priorities. The EU and Europe more generally remain underappreciated allies in Washington. The US Republican party often finds a convenient epithet for Obama’s economic policies by describing them as “European.” Consider Mitt Romney’s contentions that Obama “takes his cues from the Social Democrats of Europe” in turning America into a “European-style welfare state and entitlement society,” or Newt Gingrich’s that the President’s goal was a “European socialist state.” The Eurozone crisis, the intense interpenetration of the US and EU in each other’s economies, and the widespread perception that America’s post-2008 economic recovery was stymied in large part by developments in Europe inevitably led many in Washington to view Europe as more a burden than a strategic partner. A broader question is whether the US and Europe are drifting apart in their views of what constitutes a “good society.” New questions arose during the post-2008 recession about the ability of the American economy to sustain an upwardly mobile middle class amidst rising inequality and stubborn unemployment. With a spiralling, crippling public debt, there was little appetite in either major US party to adopt a more European-style role for the state. Sachs (2012) notes very little difference between Democrats and Republicans in terms of their view of the role of the state: Paul Ryan’s (as Romney’s Vice-Presidential candidate) budgetary proposals called for public budget outlays of 19.7 per cent of GDP in 2016 and 19.5 per cent in 2020. Meanwhile, the Obama administration proposed 19.1 per cent in 2016 and 19.7 per cent in 2020. Total US government revenues (at all levels of government) stand at about 32 per cent of GDP. In the EU, the comparable figure is 44 per cent. Other less tangible but still powerful forces also push towards drift and perhaps even fracture. One is a basic lack of American understanding of how Europe is organized politically. Even thoughtful US scholars such as Kupchan (2012: 153) misinterpret the EU by concluding (for example) that the failure of the Union’s Constitutional Treaty led ‘instead [to] drafting a dramatically scaled-down version known as the Lisbon Treaty’. By any account, Lisbon is mostly identical to the Constitutional Treaty without its constitutional trappings about an EU flag, anthem, and so on. Thinking longer term, it is perhaps more germane to the future of transatlantic relations to think that the real problem will be that European policy – including foreign policy – will become more EU-based in the decades to come while the Union struggles to command legitimacy, attention and understanding in the US. No opinion poll to our knowledge has ever shown that a majority of Americans has even heard of the EU. Meanwhile, recent polling data show that the percentage of Americans who think that Europe is the most important area of the world to the US fell from 50 per cent in 1993 to 37 per cent in 2011. Those judging that Asia was most important rose from 31 per cent to 47 per cent (PEW 2011). Having considered the forces that both push Europe and America together, and those that threaten to pull them apart, we find no conclusive evidence of either partnership or a bipolar West. Yet, on balance, the transition towards a more multipolar order heightens the incentives they confront to make common cause, particular on their bilateral economic agenda but also in managing the rise of emerging powers. We consider below what kind of collective transatlantic action might be possible and to what ends. A leading observer of contemporary IR concedes that the greatest challenge of the next decades is “establishing legitimate authority for concerted international action on behalf of the global community… at a time when old relations of authority are eroding” (Ikenberry 2011: 6). Insofar as a shift towards multipolarity creates a “crisis,” it is one of legitimacy and authority. Ikenberry (2011: 5) resorts to liberal institutionalist logic to insist that it is a crisis “within the old hegemonic organization of liberal order…[it is] not a crisis in the deep principles of the order itself. It is a crisis of governance.” Clearly, the commitment of several of the BRIC countries to “deep liberal principles” and, by extension, an international order for which they provide a foundation is questionable. At the same time, the age’s most pressing international problems – nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, economic stagnation, global warming and so on – demand not only collective governance but also leadership to give it political impulse. Whether or not we accept Ikenberry’s account, the West can secure its leadership status in any future international order only if it provides such an impulse. Inevitably, its leadershipcapacity will atrophy if Europe and America seek to lead using traditional means. In a rapidly changing environment, a “status quo leadership” aimed mainly at preserving the existing institutional architecture and distribution of power is politically toxic. Assertive leadership that seeks to impose solutions cooked up in Washington or European capitals – or between them – will prove less effective than participatory and inclusive governance. Solving the “crisis of governance” means providing new opportunities for the involvement of various types and constellations of actors in different policy sectors. What is needed is some form of what Burns (1978), in his classic work, termed “transformational leadership.” As the name implies, transformational leadership seeks transformation, often of institutions or rules. Leadership that seeks reform is a more sophisticated exercise than leadership that seeks to play by accepted rules in the pursuit of long-established goals. It embraces not only norm- and agenda-setting, but also – perhaps above all – coalition- and capacity-building. In practical terms, it must drive and shape, but not dictate, the reform of global governance. How to exert such transformational leadership is complicated. The “smart power” notion that combines hard and soft power (Nye 2008) provides a useful, but vague guiding principle whose implementation may take quite different forms in different policy fields. But its essence is combining the hard power of coercion with the soft power of persuasion. The US and Europe possess different kinds of hard power. America is capable of more coercion while the EU has resources – in the form of trade privileges or aid, but also sanctions – that make collective action (at least) possible even on hard security issues such as Iran. Yet, combining hard power with the power to persuade is extremely taxing for the transatlantic partners. Both must, first, coax collective action out of their highly compartmentalized governmental structures. Second, they must – ideally – combine resources and agree on productive divisions of labour (see Lindstrom 2005). Third, they must make the case for international action to publics whose appetite for international activism is, by recent measures, declining.

#### A nuclear Iran results in instability and results in ineffective deterrence

Kroenig and McNally ’13— Matthew, assistant professor and international relations field chair in the department of government at Georgetown University, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; and Robert, served as Senior Director for International Energy at the U.S. National Security Council and Special Assistant to the President at the U.S. National Economic Council, March 2013 (Matthew and Robert, “Iranian Nukes and Global Oil,” The American Interest, Vol. 8, No. 4.)djm

But the impact of sanctions on future Iranian production pales in comparison to the other geo-economic implications of nuclear weapons in Iran. A nuclear Iran will likely increase the frequency and scope of geopolitical conflict in the Persian Gulf and the broader Middle East. While policy analysts continue to debate how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program, most agree a nuclear-armed Iran would have grave repercussions for the region. In March 2012 President Obama stated that U.S. policy was to prevent—not contain—a nuclear-armed Iran, and he explained why: “The risks of an Iranian nuclear weapon falling into the hands of terrorist organizations are profound. It is almost certain that other players in the region would feel it necessary to get their own nuclear weapons. So now you have the prospect of a nuclear arms race in the most volatile region in the world, one that is rife with unstable governments and sectarian tensions. And it would also provide Iran the additional capability to sponsor and protect its proxies in carrying out terrorist attacks, because they are less fearful of retaliation.”10 President Obama’s fears are well-founded. Iran harbors ambitious geopolitical goals. After national survival, Iran’s primary objective is to become the most dominant state in the Middle East. In terms of international relations theory, Iran is a revisionist power. Its master national-historical narrative holds that Iran is a glorious nation with a storied past, and that it has been cheated out of its rightful place as a leading nation: Like pre-World War I Germany and China today, it is determined to reclaim its place in the sun. Currently, Iran restrains its hegemonic ambitions because it is wary of U.S. or Israeli military responses—particularly the former. But if Iran obtained nuclear weapons, its adversaries would be forced to treat it with deference if not kid gloves, even in the face of provocative acts. Iran would achieve a degree of “inverted deterrence” against stronger states by inherently raising the stakes of any military conflict against it to the nuclear level.11 As such, nuclear weapons would provide Iran with a cover under which to implement its regional ambitions with diminished fear of a U.S. military reprisal. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up its support for terrorist and proxy groups attacking Israeli, Saudi and U.S. interests in the greater Middle East and around the world; increase the harassment of and attacks against naval and commercial vessels in and near the Persian Gulf; and be more aggressive in its coercive diplomacy, possibly brandishing nuclear weapons in an attempt to intimidate adversaries and harmless, weaker neighbors alike. In short, a nuclear-armed Iran would exacerbate current conflicts in the Middle East, and this likely bears jarring consequences for global oil prices. Because of the heightened threat to global oil supply that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose, market participants would certainly add a large “risk premium” to oil prices. Oil prices reflect perceived risk in addition to information on actual events or conditions in the market. Recent history shows that even without nuclear weapons, Iran-related events in the Middle East have affected oil prices on fears they could spark a regional war. Traders bid up oil prices in January 2006 when the IAEA referred Iran to the UN Security Council. In subsequent months, news reports about heated Iranian rhetoric and military exercises helped to drive crude prices up further. The surprise outbreak of the Israel-Hizballah war in 2006, not entirely unrelated to concerns about Iran, triggered a $4 per barrel spike on contagion fears. The Iran risk premium subsided after 2007, but a roughly $10–$15 per barrel (10 percent) risk premium returned in early 2012 after the United States and the European Union put in place unusually tough sanctions and hawkish rhetoric on both sides heated up. A survey of nearly two dozen traders and analysts conducted by the Rapidan Group found that a protracted conventional conflict between the United States and Iran that resulted in a three-week closure of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz would lead to a $25 per barrel rise in oil prices, despite the use of strategic petroleum reserves.12 Were Tehran to acquire nuclear weapons, the risk premium would greatly exceed the $4–$15 per barrel (roughly 4–15 percent at current prices) already caused by a non-nuclear Iran.13 We expect a belligerent, nuclear-armed Iran would likely embed a risk premium of at least $20–$30 per barrel and spikes of $30–$100 per barrel in the event of actual conflict. Such price increases would be extremely harmful to economic growth and employment. The challenges a nuclear-armed Iran would pose for the oil market are exacerbated by a prospective diminished U.S. ability to act as guarantor of stability in the Gulf. U.S. military presence and intervention has been critical to resolving past threats or geopolitical crises in the region. It has also calmed oil markets in the past. Examples include escorting oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq War, the destruction of much of Iran’s surface fleet in response to Iran’s mining the Gulf in 1988 and leading a coalition to repel Saddam Hussein’s short-lived invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Currently, the United States can use and threaten to use force against Iran without fear that Iran will retaliate with nuclear weapons. When Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz in the past, for example, the United States has announced that it would reopen the Strait if Iran went through with it, confident that the U.S. military could quickly prevail in any conventional conflict with Iran while running very little risk of retaliation. If Iran had nuclear weapons, however, U.S. military options would be constrained by inverted deterrence. U.S. threats to use force to reopen the Strait could be countered by Iranian threats to use devastatingly deadly force against U.S. allies, bases or forces in the region. Such threats might not be entirely credible since the U.S. military would control any imaginable escalation ladder up to and including the nuclear threshold, but it wouldn’t be entirely incredible, either, given the risk of accident or inadvertent nuclear use in a high-stakes crisis. If, further, Iran develops ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States—and the annual report of the U.S. Department of Defense estimates this could happen as soon as 2015—Iran could also threaten nuclear strikes against the U.S. homeland in retaliation for the use of conventional forces in the region. Any U.S. President would have to think long and hard about using force against Iran if it entailed a risk of nuclear war, even a nuclear war that the United States would win. Most worrisome, an unstable, poly-nuclear Middle East will mean that nuclear weapons will be ever-present factors in most, if not all, future regional conflicts. As President Obama noted in the remarks excerpted above, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and other states might follow suit. Nuclear weapons in these states would further complicate the nuclear balance in the region and potentially extend the boundaries of any nuclear exchange. Even if Iran’s leaders are less reckless and suicidal than their rhetoric would suggest, international politics, crises and miscalculation do not end when countries acquire nuclear weapons. Nuclear powers still challenge nuclear-armed adversaries. As the early decades of the Cold War remind us, nuclear-armed states do sometimes resort to nuclear brinkmanship that can lead to high-stakes nuclear standoffs. We were lucky to survive the Cold War without suffering a massive nuclear exchange; President Kennedy estimated that the probability of nuclear war in the Cuban Missile Crisis alone was as high as 50 percent.14 The reference to the early days of the Cold War is not merely decorative here. Nearly all of the conditions that helped us avoid nuclear war during the latter half of the Cold War are absent from the Iran-Israel-U.S. nuclear balance. Then, there were only two players, both with secure, second-strike capabilities and strategic depth; relatively long flight times for ballistic missiles between states, enabling all sides to eschew launch-on-warning postures; clear lines of communication between capitals; and more. In a high-stakes nuclear crisis with Iran and its adversaries, there is a real risk that things could spiral out of control and result in nuclear war**.**

### Plan

#### Thus the plan, the United States federal government ought to include the United Mexican States in the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.

## 2ac

### 2ac – toward

####  “Toward” is a direction, not a result

Oliver 7 – Dennis Oliver, ESL and Developmental English Teacher, “Prepositions: Using "To" and & "Toward" for Places”, Dave’s ESL Café, http://www.eslcafe.com/grammar/prepositions07.html

The preposition to is another common preposition of place. It is normally used with a verb showing movement and shows the result of the movement-- the place or person that the movement was toward or in the direction of. The preposition toward has a similar meaning, but it's not exactly the same: with toward, the direction of the movement is shown, but not the result.

#### Choice of “toward” is intentional --- reject their unpredictable interpretation

Ector 1879 – P.J. Ector, Judge in the Court of Appeals of Texas, “H. H. Hudson v. The State”, 6 Tex. Ct. App. 565; 1879 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 143, Lexis

Mr. Webster, in his Unabridged Dictionary, gives "toward," when used as a preposition, the following meaning, to wit: "Toward--1. In the direction to. 2. With direction to; in a moral sense, with regard to, regarding. [\*576] 3. With ideal tendency to. 4. Nearly." If the Legislature had intended that such insulting words must be used by the deceased to or in the presence of the female, in order to reduce the killing to manslaughter, [\*\*18] some other word than "towards," and one that would have better expressed the idea, would have been used in the statute. It appears clear to us that, on the plainest principles of justice and reason, it could make no difference, so far as the provocation is concerned in this instance, whether the deceased told the wife of the defendant that she was a prostitute, or her husband that he had married a prostitute. The extent of the transport of passion, to extenuate the guilt of the homicide, would be as great in the one case as in the other. And in every case when such a defence is relied on to reduce the killing to manslaughter, the jury must be at liberty to determine whether, under all the circumstances, the insulting words were the real cause which provoked the killing. The court did not err in overruling defendant's motion in arrest of judgment.

### 2ac – K

#### The Role of the Ballot is Policy Simulation

Hodson 10 Derek, professor of education – Ontario Institute for Studies @ University of Toronto, “Science Education as a Call to Action,” Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education, Vol. 10, Issue 3, p. 197-206

\*\*note: SSI = socioscientific issues

The final (fourth) level of sophistication in this issues-based approach is concerned with students findings ways of putting their values and convictions into action, helping them to prepare for and engage in responsible action, and assisting them in **developing the skills**, attitudes, and values **that will enable them to** take control of their lives, **cooperate with others to bring about change**, and work toward a more just and sustainable world in which power, wealth, and resources are more equitably shared. Socially and environmentally responsible behavior will not necessarily follow from knowledge of key concepts and possession of the “right attitudes.” As Curtin (1991) reminded us, it is important to distinguish between caring about and caring for. It is almost always much easier to proclaim that one cares about an issue than to do something about it. Put simply, our values are worth nothing until we live them. Rhetoric and espoused values will not bring about social justice and will not save the planet. We must change our actions. A politicized ethic of care (caring for) entails active involvement in a local manifestation of a particular problem or issue, exploration of the complex sociopolitical contexts in which the problem/issue is located, and attempts to resolve conflicts of interest. FROM STSE RHETORIC TO SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTION Writing from the perspective of environmental education, Jensen (2002) categorized the **knowledge** that is **likely to promote sociopolitical action** and encourage pro-environmental behavior into four dimensions: (a) **scientific and technological knowledge** that informs the issue or problem; (b) knowledge about the underlying social, political, and economic issues, conditions, and structures and how they contribute to creating social and environmental problems; (c) knowledge about how to bring about changes in society through direct or indirect action; and (d) knowledge about the likely outcome or direction of possible actions and the **desirability of those outcomes.** Although formulated as a model for environmental education, it is reasonable to suppose that Jensen's arguments are applicable to all forms of SSI-oriented action. Little needs to be said about dimensions 1 and 2 in Jensen's framework beyond the discussion earlier in the article. With regard to dimension 3, students need knowledge of actions that are likely to have positive impact and knowledge of how to engage in them. **It is essential** that they gain robust knowledge of the social, legal, and **political system(s)** that prevail in the communities in which they live and develop a clear understanding of how **decisions** are **made within** local, regional, and **national government** and within industry, commerce, and the military. Without knowledge of where and with whom power of decision making is located and awareness of the **mechanisms by which decisions are reached**, **intervention is not possible.** Thus, the curriculum I propose requires a concurrent program designed to achieve a measure of political literacy, including knowledge of how to engage in collective action with individuals who have different competencies, backgrounds, and attitudes but share a common interest in a particular SSI. Dimension 3 also includes knowledge of likely sympathizers and potential allies and strategies for encouraging cooperative action and group interventions. What Jensen did not mention but would seem to be a part of dimension 3 knowledge is the nature of science-oriented knowledge that would enable students to appraise the statements, reports, and arguments of scientists, politicians, and journalists and to present their own supporting or opposing arguments in a coherent, robust, and convincing way (s

ee Hodson [2009b] for a lengthy discussion of this aspect of science education). Jensen's fourth category includes awareness of how (and why) others have sought to bring about change and entails formulation of a vision of the kind of world in which we (and our families and communities) wish to live. It is important for students to explore and develop their ideas, dreams, and aspirations for themselves, their neighbors and families and for the wider communities at local, regional, national, and global levels—a clear overlap with futures studies/education. An essential step in cultivating the critical scientific and technological literacy on which **sociopolitical action depends** is the application of a social and political critique capable of challenging the notion of technological determinism. We can control technology and its environmental and social impact. More significantly, we can control the controllers and redirect technology in such a way that adverse environmental impact is substantially reduced (if not entirely eliminated) and issues of freedom, equality, and justice are kept in the forefront of discussion during the **establishment of policy**.

#### They don’t have a concrete alternative – kills activism

Bryant ‘12

(Levi Bryant is currently a Professor of Philosophy at Collin College. In addition to working as a professor, Bryant has also served as a Lacanian psychoanalyst. He received his Ph.D. from Loyola University in Chicago, Illinois, where he originally studied 'disclosedness' with the Heidegger scholar Thomas Sheehan. Bryant later changed his dissertation topic to the transcendental empiricism of Gilles Deleuze, “Critique of the Academic Left”, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/)

I must be in a mood today– half irritated, half amused –because I find myself ranting. Of course, that’s not entirely unusual. So this afternoon I came across a post by a friend quoting something discussing the environmental movement that pushed all the right button. As the post read,¶ For mainstream environmentalism– conservationism, green consumerism, and resource management –humans are conceptually separated out of nature and mythically placed in privileged positions of authority and control over ecological communities and their nonhuman constituents. What emerges is the fiction of a marketplace of ‘raw materials’ and ‘resources’ through which human-centered wants, constructed as needs, might be satisfied. The mainstream narratives are replete with such metaphors [carbon trading!]. Natural complexity,, mutuality, and diversity are rendered virtually meaningless given discursive parameters that reduce nature to discrete units of exchange measuring extractive capacities. Jeff Shantz, “Green Syndicalism”¶ While finding elements this description perplexing– I can’t say that I see many environmentalists treating nature and culture as distinct or suggesting that we’re sovereigns of nature –I do agree that we conceive much of our relationship to the natural world in economic terms (not a surprise that capitalism is today a universal). This, however, is not what bothers me about this passage.¶ What I wonder is just what we’re supposed to do *even if* all of this is true? What, given existing conditions, are we to do if all of this is right? At least green consumerism, conservation, resource management, and things like carbon trading are engaging in activities that are making real differences. From this passage– and maybe the entire text would disabuse me of this conclusion –it sounds like we are to reject all of these interventions because they remain tied to a capitalist model of production that the author (and myself) find abhorrent. The idea seems to be that if we endorse these things we are tainting our hands and would therefore do well to reject them altogether.¶ The problem as I see it is that this is the worst sort of abstraction (in the Marxist sense) and wishful thinking. Within a Marxo-Hegelian context, a thought is abstract when it ignores all of the mediations in which a thing is embedded. For example, I understand a robust tree abstractly when I attribute its robustness, say, to its genetics alone, ignoring the complex relations to its soil, the air, sunshine, rainfall, etc., that also allowed it to grow robustly in this way. This is the sort of critique we’re always leveling against the neoliberals. They are abstract thinkers. In their doxa that individuals are entirely responsible for themselves and that they completely make themselves by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, neoliberals ignore all the mediations belonging to the social and material context in which human beings develop that play a role in determining the vectors of their life. They ignore, for example, that George W. Bush grew up in a family that was highly connected to the world of business and government and that this gave him opportunities that someone living in a remote region of Alaska in a very different material infrastructure and set of family relations does not have. To think concretely is to engage in a cartography of these mediations, a mapping of these networks, from circumstance to circumstance (what I call an “onto-cartography”). It is to map assemblages, networks, or ecologies in the constitution of entities.¶ Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park:¶ The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this:¶ Phase 1: Collect Underpants¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Profit!¶ They even have a catchy song to go with their work:¶ Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows:¶ Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation!¶ Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives.

 In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing?¶ But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done!¶ But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, *and when we do*, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc.¶ What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems? How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri & Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle.¶ I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans? But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives. Masturbation.¶ “Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need less critique not because critique isn’t important or necessary– it is –but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique? What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them. Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.

#### Globalization is necessary to uphold American primacy

Lindsay et. al. 3 (“The Globalization of Politics: American Foreign Policy for a New Century”, Council on Foreign Relations, Winter 2003, http://www.cfr.org/world/globalization-politics-american-foreign-policy-new-century/p6330)

And the United States does differ from other countries. Unique among past hegemons in not seeking to expand its power through territorial gains, it is also unique among its contemporaries. Its primacy and global interests prompt others both to seek its assistance in addressing their problems and to resent it for meddling in their affairs. The ambivalence the world feels about American engagement— as well as the unique nature of that engagement— makes it imperative that the United States not mistake the conduct of foreign policy for a popularity contest. Doing the right thing may not always be popular— but it is vitally important nevertheless. But Globalists are right that while America is powerful, it is not omnipotent. Far more able than most countries to protect itself against the pernicious consequences of globalization, it is by no means invulnerable. Some crucial problems do defy unilateral solutions. Global warming is perhaps the most obvious case, but others include stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction and fighting global terrorism. In other cases, such as protecting the American homeland from terrorist attack, unilateral action can reduce but not eliminate risks. Similarly, unilateral American power may not be enough to sustain the benefits of globalization. Globalization is not irreversible. World War I, the Russian Revolution, and the Great Depression combined to strangle the economic and social interactions that emerged early in the 20th century. Economic globalization today rests on an intricate web of international trade and financial institutions. Extending, developing, and improving these institutions requires the cooperation of others. Without it, the benefits of globalization, which help to underwrite American power, could erode. Globalization has greatly broadened America's foreign policy agenda. Infectious diseases, poverty, and poor governance not only offend our moral sensibilities but also represent potential new security threats. Failed and failing states endanger not just their own citizens but Americans as well. If the United States cannot find ways to encourage prosperity and good governance, it runs the risk of seeing threats to its security multiply. It could eventually find itself harmed not by bears in the woods but by swarms of tiny pests. Finally, cooperation can extend the life of American primacy. Working with others can spread the costs of action over a wider array of actors, enabling the United States to do more with less. By creating international regimes and organizations Washington can imbed its interests and values in institutions that will shape and constrain countries for decades, regardless of the vicissitudes of American power. And cooperation can build bonds with other countries, lessening the chances of cultural and political tactics that can over the years sap U.S. power.

#### Capitalism is key to the formation of successful space programs

Martin 10 (Robert, Amerika, June 21, <http://www.amerika.org/politics/centrifuge-capitalism/>, accessed: 3 July 2011)

Centralization and capitalism are necessary for any intelligent civilization, yet in excess drains the base population of any sustenance whatsoever, leaving them unemployed, homeless and starving at worst. The answer to this event is not a swing on the pendulum all the way onto total equality fisted socialism out on a plate for everyone who isn’t rich, that would be devastating for organization, but is a more natural ecosystem type of financing of a near-barter economics with different values and currencies for localized entities and more buoyant monetary for inter-localities – only monetizing where absolutely necessary. Without the higher economics that goes beyond small barter communities, there could be no space programs, or planetary defences providing the technology or the organization necessary to survive extinction events or fund a military etc, it’s critical for the structure of the superorganism – yet too much and some individuals inside of it become so padded from outside reality that they completely ignore the world around them.

#### Extinction – we have to go to space

Garan 10 – Astronaut (Ron, 3/30/10, Speech published in an article by Nancy Atkinson, “The Importance of Returning to the Moon,” <http://www.universetoday.com/61256/astronaut-explains-why-we-should-return-to-the-moon>)

Resources and Other Benefits: Since we live in a world of finite resources and the global population continues to grow, at some point the human race must utilize resources from space in order to survive. We are already constrained by our limited resources, and the decisions we make today will have a profound affect on the future of humanity. Using resources and energy from space will enable continued growth and the spread of prosperity to the developing world without destroying our planet. Our minimal investment in space exploration (less than 1 percent of the U.S. budget) reaps tremendous intangible benefits in almost every aspect of society, from technology development to high-tech jobs. When we reach the point of sustainable space operations we will be able to transform the world from a place where nations quarrel over scarce resources to one where the basic needs of all people are met and we unite in the common adventure of exploration. The first step is a sustainable permanent human lunar settlement.

#### Neoliberal policies led to internal Mexican reform

Kim 1/30/13 – (Dongwoo, “Modernization or Betrayal: Neoliberalism in Mexico”, Constellations, http://ejournals.library.ualberta.ca/index.php/constellations/article/view/18860/14650)

Carlos Salinas’ series of neoliberal economic policies culminated with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada. Salinas was at first disinterested in forming a bilateral agreement with the United States.10 After all, the PRI had staunchly closed up the Mexican economy to the world for the last sixty years and gained popularity from its nationalist and defensive economic policies (especially against the United States), most notably the nationalization of the petroleum industry in late 1930s by president Lázaro Cárdenas. However, due to the “lukewarm” response from the world leaders during his European tour, which included a stop at the World Economic Forum in February of 1989, Salinas realized that the only way of drawing investors to Mexico was to “provide [them] with both cheap labor and privileged access to the U.S. market.”11 Salinas immediately approached the American government officials with the intention of negotiating a bilateral free trade agreement, shortly thereafter the administration shifted policies for the preparation and successful negotiation of NAFTA. Carlos Salinas thus marketed NAFTA with fervor in and outside of Mexico and hastened the pace of the neoliberal reforms. Salinas wrote that he made efforts to “disseminate more information and confirm the active presence of key economic, labor, and business leaders in working groups” during the period of NAFTA negotiation.12 His administration privatized public corporations and implemented land reforms. Furthermore, Carlos Salinas marketed his neoliberal policies as means of modernizing the Mexican politics as well, thus associating neoliberalism with democracy. In November 1990, Salinas said both political and economic problems, which he described as “clouds,” were “dissipating.”13 Some even referred to Salinas’ reforms as “Salinastroika,” paralleling these to the radical introduction of socio-political transparency and freedom in the former Soviet Union.14 The Salinas administration thus provided hope that these neoliberal economic policies would continue as political reforms as well. Seemingly, Carlos Salinas’ reforms were successful; his policies did draw foreign investments, Mexico relieved itself of a significant amount of debt and its economy grew by 4.4% in 1993.15 Salinas administration earned the reputation as a “political juggernaut” for its political competency.16 The elections for federal senators and state governors held in 1991 reflected the surging popularity of the Salinas administration; the PRI candidates won 61 percent of the congressional votes, giving Salinas “the power to make laws without having to seek any support from the opposition.”17 Most importantly, Carlos Salinas’ leadership earned the respect and confidence of foreign investors. According to Dillon and Preston, President Clinton praised Salinas for giving Mexico “better leadership than ever in [Clinton’s] lifetime” and The Wall Street Journal “looked favorably on [his] reforms.”18 Salinas was thus deemed a progressive and modern leader by the “first world,” and many believed that Mexico was truly modernizing.

### 2ac – CP

#### EU can’t get Mexico on board

EA 5/27/13 – (“EU-US trade deal seen with concern in Mexico”, EurActiv, http://www.euractiv.com/development-policy/eu-trans-atlantic-deal-seen-conc-news-520010)//javi

Mexico, which sees itself as a privileged US partner, is concerned about the possible consequences of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), Spanish MEP Ricardo Cortés Lastra told EurActiv in an interview. Cortés Lastra, who is the author of the report on the basis of which the European Parliament Resolution “On defining a new development cooperation policy with Latin America” was adopted in June 2012, shared his impression from his recent visit to Mexico, where he held talks with his counterparts. The Sociliast and Democrat MEP said that his Mexican colleagues were worried that the EU-US trade deal could have as a result that the EU would become a more important to the US at the expense of Mexico. “Logically Mexico, which has the US as great business partner and has a little diversified market, watches with some concern what kind of consequence these agreements might have,” he said. The ideas expressed by Cortés Lastra reflect the state of mind reported in other developing countries, especially in Africa. Both the EU and the US give trade preferences to some African nations, but their benefit schemes differ. Therefore the expected policy harmonisation is raises the question on the negative consequences for some of the countries. Cortés Lastra also said that the EU needed to put in place a new bilateral agreement, the current one, called Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement, dating to 1997. Criticism at the Commission The Spanish MEP blasted the Commission for scaling down its development activities in Latin America. He said that the European Parliament wanted to send a message that Latin America remains, and will remain important to Europe, but that the Commission was “issuing the opposite message”. Even though some Latin American countries have progressed economically, “enormous pockets of poverty” remained, and the EU “should not allow itself” to stop its aid, he insisted.

#### The EU can’t effectively include Mexico into a large trade agreement – lack of integration

Schott and Oegg 1 – Senior Fellow; Research Associate (Jeffrey J. Schott and Barbara Oegg, “Europe and the Americas: Toward a TAFTA-South?”, World Economy, http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/schott0601.pdf)

To be sure, the European Union itself has not proposed a broad free trade pact with Latin America similar to the “Free Trade Area of the Americas” under negotiation between the United States and 33 other countries in the Western Hemisphere (see Schott and Hufbauer 1999). Given the diversity in size and level of economic development of Europe’s trading partners in Latin America and the Caribbean Basin, a TAFTA-South agreement would be a daunting task. In some respects, it is comparable to, though much less well defined than, the pursuit of an FTAA among Western Hemisphere countries. Indeed, like the United States, the European Union has started the process by taking small steps with individual countries and regional groups; unlike the United States, it has not yet integrated those initiatives into a single negotiation that over time could create a super-regional free trade zone.

#### Warming won’t cause extinction

Barrett 07, professor of natural resource economics – Columbia University

(Scott, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction)

First, climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species.5 If unchecked, it will cause other species to become extinction (though biodiversity is being depleted now due to other reasons). It will alter critical ecosystems (though this is also happening now, and for reasons unrelated to climate change). It will reduce land area as the seas rise, and in the process displace human populations. “Catastrophic” climate change is possible, but not certain. Moreover, and unlike an asteroid collision, large changes (such as sea level rise of, say, ten meters) will likely take centuries to unfold, giving societies time to adjust. “Abrupt” climate change is also possible, and will occur more rapidly, perhaps over a decade or two. However, abrupt climate change (such as a weakening in the North Atlantic circulation), though potentially very serious, is unlikely to be ruinous. Human-induced climate change is an experiment of planetary proportions, and we cannot be sur of its consequences. Even in a worse case scenario, however, global climate change is not the equivalent of the Earth being hit by mega-asteroid. Indeed, if it were as damaging as this, and if we were sure that it would be this harmful, then our incentive to address this threat would be overwhelming. The challenge would still be more difficult than asteroid defense, but we would have done much more about it by now.

#### TTIP checks China rise – bilateralism

Laidi 7/23/13 – (Zaki, “EU takes a bad trade gamble against US”, China Daily, <http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2013-07/23/content_16814600.htm>)//javi

Over the past half century, the EU, which represents only 7 percent of the global population, has managed to maintain an exceptionally strong trade position, despite the rise of emerging markets like China. So, while the US and Japan have seen their respective shares of global exports fall, the EU's share has remained stable, at around 20 percent. Indeed, EU trade power contrasts sharply with the perception of a weakened Europe. Most important, Europe was able to achieve it only by investing heavily in a multilateral trade system through the GATT and then the World Trade Organization. And yet, while the EU owes much to the multilateral trade system, since 2006, it, too, has shifted to bilateralism, scoring its biggest successes with free-trade agreements with Latin America and South Korea. An agreement with Canada is now within reach (though bilateral negotiations with India seem to have stalled, probably because the Indians do not believe that a free trade agreement would help them much). Officially, the EU considers a bilateral approach to trade to be perfectly compatible with a return to multilateralism. But the facts belie this. First, it is clear that bilateralism is growing as multilateralism wanes. Since 2008, when the WTO's Doha Round of global free-trade talks collapsed, the Europeans have proved unable to bring the US, China and India back to the multilateral negotiating table. More important, they evidently have given up trying. This is reflected in the EU's reluctance to press emerging countries to become parties to the WTO's multilateral Agreement on Government Procurement, as if it has accepted that this issue can be resolved only bilaterally. Moreover, since 2008, US trade policy has deliberately abandoned multilateralism in order to pursue containment of China via a two-pronged strategy: the planned Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the TTIP. The reason for this change is simple: The US no longer has the power to set the rules of the global trade system, but it considers itself strong enough to work around them. The EU partly shares America's strategic objective here, because it, too, has grievances against emerging powers in terms of market access, compliance with intellectual property rights, access to government procurement and subsidies to state companies. But Europe must avoid alignment with this new and narrow US trade focus for several reasons.

Unchecked Chinese rise risks global nuclear war

C. Dale Walton 7, Lecturer in International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, 2007, Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the 21st Century, p. 49

Obviously, it is of vital importance to the United States that the PRC does not become the hegemon of Eastern Eurasia. As noted above, however, regardless of what Washington does, China's success in such an endeavor is not as easily attainable as pessimists might assume. The PRC appears to be on track to be a very great power indeed, but geopolitical conditions are not favorable for any Chinese effort to establish sole hegemony; a robust multipolar system should suffice to keep China in check, even with only minimal American intervention in local squabbles. The more worrisome danger is that Beijing will cooperate with a great power partner, establishing a very muscular axis. Such an entity would present a critical danger to the balance of power, thus both necessitating very **active American intervention** in Eastern Eurasia and **creating the** underlying **conditions for a massive**, and probably **nuclear, great power war**. Absent such a "super-threat," however, the demands on American leaders will be far more subtle: creating the conditions for Washington's gentle decline from playing the role of unipolar quasi-hegemon to being "merely" the greatest of the world's powers, while aiding in the creation of a healthy multipolar system that is not marked by close great power alliances.

#### Plan is key to cyber security cooperation and upgrades

Ukraine General Newswire, 13 – (8-31, “U.S., Baltic states reaffirm commitment to Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership talks” nexis)djm

The U.S., Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening their relations by jointly expanding trade ties "in pursuit of economic prosperity, enhancing strategic cooperation to address global security challenges, and advancing democracy and human rights around the world." "Recognizing the benefits and risks of our increasing dependence on information technology and cyberspace, we will strengthen our engagement on cyber issues regionally and globally. We will seek to advance the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure in the region through public/private cooperation," it says. "We will continue to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of cybercrimes. We will strive to advance our shared vision of internet freedom by engaging with other countries, international organizations, civil society, and the private sector. Our efforts support a common goal: an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet that protects privacy and civil liberties, enables the free flow of information and ideas, and promotes the innovation essential to modern economies," the statement says.

### 2ac – politics

#### Shutdown Concessions Strengthened GOP Gridlock – Obama Gained Zero Momentum From the Win

By Tim Stanley US Historian 10/16 October 16th, 2013 US debt ceiling crisis – Barack Obama has won the shutdown. His prize is a lame duck presidency http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/timstanley/100241757/us-debt-ceiling-crisis-barack-obama-has-won-the-shutdown-his-prize-is-a-lame-duck-presidency/

Second, what has Obama really won? He keeps his precious healthcare reform and he gets government open again – but tomorrow morning he will still have the same gridlocked political system that he had the night before. The shutdown is a rare example of him winning, but remember that this lame duck president has not only had a very simple (and, frankly, inoffensive) gun control bill killed in the Senate but was so spooked by bad poll numbers that he tried to dump responsibility for military action in Syria onto the Congress – before quietly dropping the idea altogether. Any thought that the shutdown payoff will be that he can sail an immigration reform package comfortably through Congress is pure fantasy. This is a broken presidency living out its last few years either holding off Republican attacks or lazily cruising the country on some pointless, endless, fatuous campaign trail. Obama's administration is politically bankrupt.¶ The talk for the next week will be about how the Tea Party is dead and Republicans must elect a politically correct, middle-of-the-road, unimaginative, establishment, compromising candidate in 2016 (preferably a singing sloth, cos the polls show that Americans just love those). But the reality is that US politics right now is a mess for both Left and Right, and the country is stuck in partisan limbo until the 2014 midterms or even the 2016 presidential election. This is not a Republican problem, it is an American problem.

#### Even if Obama Has PC He Lacks Credibility to Influence Congress

Koffler 10/11

Keith Koffler, who covered the White House as a reporter for CongressDaily and Roll Call

Obama’s crisis of credibility

By: Keith Koffler

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http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=CFCD7934-C4A3-4CCC-8261-9038B7E1D759

President Barack Obama is like a novice flier thrust into the cockpit of a 747. He’s pushing buttons, flipping switches and radioing air traffic control, but nothing’s happening. The plane is just slowly descending on its own, and while it may or may not crash, it at least doesn’t appear to be headed to any particularly useful destination.¶ Obama’s ineffectiveness, always a hallmark of his presidency, has reached a new cruising altitude this year. Not even a year into his second term, he looks like a lame duck and quacks like a lame duck. You guessed it — he’s a lame duck.¶ On the world stage, despite Obama’s exertions, Iran’s centrifuges are still spinning, the Israelis and Palestinians remain far apart, Bashar Assad is still in power, the Taliban are gaining strength and Iraq is gripped by renewed violence.¶ At home, none of Obama’s agenda has passed this year. Republicans aren’t bowing to him in the battle of the budget, and much of the GOP seems uninterested in House Speaker John Boehner’s vision of some new grand bargain with the president.Obama has something worse on his hands than being hated. All presidents get hated. But Obama is being ignored. And that’s because he has no credibility. A president enters office having earned a certain stock of political capital just for getting elected. He then spends it down, moving his agenda forward, until he collects a fresh supply by getting reelected. But political capital is only the intangible substrate that gives a president his might. His presidency must also be nourished by credibility — a sense he can be trusted, relied upon and feared — to make things happen. A president enters office with a measure of credibility. After all, he seemed at least trustworthy enough to get elected. But unlike political capital, credibility must be built in office. Otherwise, it is squandered. Obama has used every credibility-busting method available to eviscerate any sense that he can be counted on. He’s dissimulated, proven his unreliability, ruled arbitrarily and turned the White House into a Chicago-style political boiler room. His credibility has been sapped with his political opponents, a public that thinks him incompetent, our allies, who don’t trust him, and, even worse, our enemies, who don’t fear him.

#### Obama announced the plan

Feldman 8/9/13 – (Elliot, “United States: TPP, TTIP, And Congress: The Elephant In The Room”, Mondaq, http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/257058/international+trade+investment/TPP+TTIP+And+Congress+The+Elephant+In+The+Room)

The Washington trade policy community is buzzing over the two largest international trade negotiations since the effective collapse of the Doha multilateral trade round. The buzz may be even louder in foreign capitals. The Obama Administration, in mid-July, was still promising to complete the Trans Pacific Partnership ("TPP") negotiations by year-end, while starting up the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership ("TTIP") negotiations with similar speedy objectives. For both deals there is engagement and enthusiasm. Inside U.S. Trade, the trade community's weekly Bible, devoted over thirty pages, all but one article in a recent edition, to these negotiations.

#### No link – trade doesn’t face opposition

Llana 7/8/13 – (Sara Miller, “Will US-EU trade talks spur growth - or show globalization's limits?”, CSM, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2013/0708/Will-US-EU-trade-talks-spur-growth-or-show-globalization-s-limits)//javi

So far TTIP has not generated widespread controversy in the US. That might be because it’s still early days. But it’s also because of the nature of the deal, says Charles Kupchan, a transatlantic expert at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington. “Since trade is relatively free and since [the US] and the EU are at similar stages of development, this is not a deal that is going to cause major dislocation,” he says. “This is an easier sell politically.” Opposition might be stronger on the European side. Already the French sought to invoke the so-called “cultural exception” in the talks, as a way to protect its movie industry from an incursion from Hollywood. France ultimately agreed to allow media to be included in talks so that they could officially launch, but it will be among the most difficult issues to negotiate.

#### The plan is bipartisan- no backlash and different from other trade agreements

Schott and Cimino 13- Jeffrey J. is a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, joined the Institute in 1983. Cathleen Cimino has been research analyst at the Peterson Institute for International Economics since 2012

To be sure, disagreements over these issues have confounded transatlantic officials for almost two decades. One of the reasons for past failures has been that negotiators tried to break down barriers in a piecemeal fashion. Attempts to achieve limited “mutual recognition” deals on specific products or sectors foundered because of strong resistance from independent regulatory agencies pressing their own agendas in response to political pressures. Trying to reach a more comprehensive deal offers the oportunity to garner sufficient political support to off set those political obstacles. Indeed, Max Baucus, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, emphasized this point in a recent Financial Times op-ed, noting that “any bilateral trade and investment agreement must be comprehensive and address the full range of barriers to US goods and services if it is to receive broad, bipartisan congressional support.” 4 One way to avoid past mistakes and indeed to overcome the understandable skepticism of many would be for the two sides to learn from the success of several recent comprehensive bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs)—most notably the accords that the European Union and the United States each have with South Korea. These two agreements successfully liberalized trade and investment in goods and services in a manner that shows a path to success for the TTIP, which as we discuss below, is essentially what the HLWG has recommended. If the United States and the European Union follow this path, they could achieve a transatlantic accord in the next few years that both contributes to stronger economic growth and establishes a 21st century rulebook for trade that can provide a benchmark for new regional and multilateral trade agreements.

#### Visas fail to get independent tech start-ups

Helper 13

[Lauren, Economic Development Reporter, “H1-B: A Work Visa that Puts Life in Limbo,” Silicon Valley Business Journal, 1/18, http://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2013/01/17/h1-b-a-work-visa-that-puts-life-in.html?page=all]

For immigrants, the H-1B visa represents a thread of hope that can entangle the most ambitious entrepreneurs.¶ Current H-1B policies can both stifle startups and force immigrants to seek sponsorship from big, established companies when they’d rather be pursuing the next great idea at their own company.¶ In 2008 alone, 404,907 foreign nationals applied for H-1B visas. Only 129,464 people got them. There is annual cap of 65,000 H-1B visas, plus 20,000 more for foreign nationals with advanced U.S. degrees. Universities and associated nonprofits are exempt from this cap.¶ Those numbers spelled difficulty for New Delhi native Prayag Narula. Narula, 28, co-founded the startup MobileWorks, an online business that connects people seeking intermittent labor with jobs that pay a living wage.¶ Focus on immigration¶ Borrowed time: Immigrant entrepreneurs step out of the shadows¶ H1-B: A work visa that puts life in limbo¶ For foreign talent, a high-seas haven¶ Immigration tab: 3 months, $10K, many headaches¶ After graduation from U.C. Berkeley in 2012, Narula was hoping his MobileWorks project would qualify him for an H-1B employer visa — one of the most common, and widely-panned, employment visas — to stay in the country and keep growing the startup.¶ But Narula’s lawyers encouraged him to apply for a more temporary Optional Practical Training program for former U.S. students, since visa evaluators often view startups with skepticism. He’s currently working while in the OPT program.¶ The bar for workers seeking H-1B visas is high: Companies must prove that employees can be paid prevailing industry salaries (a dicey proposition at many startups). Narula said his attorneys recommended that he document at least $500,000 in company funding, which MobileWorks didn’t have at the time.¶ MobileWorks’ difficulties securing an H-1B for Narula is particularly telling, given its profile.¶ The company, which participated in the Y Combinator startup incubator in 2011, was singled out by Forbes on the publication’s 30 Under 30 list for social entrepreneurs in 2012.¶ “It’s really frustrating,” Narula said. “We have employed people all over the world. We employ hundreds of thousands of Americans.”¶ For now, he has one year on his OPT visa, plus a possible 15-month extension, before he has to arrange new documentation.¶ His experience navigating the murky H-1B visa system is a variation on a common theme

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#### Scientific consensus agrees with us

**Taylor 09** (James, Senior Fellow Env. Policy @ Heartland Institute, Naples Daily News, “Guest Commentary: Global warming”, http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2009/jan/03/guest-commentary-global-warming/)

In a pair of recent columns claiming humans are causing a global-warming crisis, Ben Bova disparages mere “assertions” while saying people need to rely on “observable, measurable facts.” While Bova’s concern about Earth’s climate is admirable, he should follow his own advice regarding assertions versus facts. Bova asserts Earth has a “rising fever.” Yet the fact is that global temperatures are unusually cool. For most of the past 10,000 years temperatures have been 1.0 to 3.0 degrees Celsius warmer than they are today. The 0.6 degree rise in temperatures during the 20th century occurred from the baseline of the little ice age, which saw the coldest global temperatures during the past 10,000 years. Earth has a “rising fever” only if we pretend the little ice age was “normal” and ignore Earth’s long-term temperature facts. Bova asserts “the loss of sea ice in the Arctic is threatening the survival of polar bears.” Yet the fact is that polar bear numbers have doubled since the 1980s. Moreover, Antarctic sea ice is growing and has been setting records for much of the past year. If “global” warming is causing receding polar ice, then why is Antarctic sea ice setting growth records? Bova asserts “measurements ... show that the rise in global temperatures matches quite closely the increase in carbon dioxide.” Yet the fact is that solar scientists at Harvard and other leading universities have published research in the world’s leading scientific journals showing that temperatures match solar output much more closely than carbon dioxide, even in the 20th century. Bova asserts that as a result of global warming “much of our crop land turns to desert.” Yet, the fact is that global precipitation and global soil moisture have increased during the 20th century, and the Sahara Desert and other deserts around the world are in retreat. Bova asserts we run the risk of a breaching a “tipping point” or a “greenhouse cliff where the global climate shifts too rapidly for us to protect ourselves from its drastic effects.” Yet, the fact is that in a recent survey of more than 500 climate scientists from around the world, less than half agreed that “assuming climate change will occur, it will occur so suddenly that a lack of preparation could result in devastation of some areas of the world.” Bova asserts that in California’s Yosemite National Park warmer temperatures are allowing mice and pine trees to live at higher altitudes than a century ago. Yet, the fact is that fossilized trees exist at altitudes above the current California tree line, showing that temperatures were significantly warmer 1,000 years ago than today. Plant and animal species are migrating to higher elevations only in comparison to the abnormally cold temperatures of the little ice age that ended just over a century ago. For most of the past 10,000 years, warmer temperatures enabled mice and trees to live at altitudes significantly higher than is possible today. Global-warming activism is long on unsubstantiated assertions and short on objective facts. Only by comparing today’s temperatures to the abnormal cold of the little ice are — and by completely ignoring the warmer temperatures that predominated during most of the past 10,000 years — can global-warming activists paint a picture of a planet suffering a global warming crisis. Moreover, sound science has thrown cold water on each and every one of the alleged global-warming crises, such as endangered polar bears, melting ice caps, etc., alleged to result from global warming.

#### Tickell’s wrong – no extinction, millennia timeframe, and intervening actors solve

Lomborg, ’08 Björn Lomborg, director of the Copenhagen Consensus Center and adjunct professor at the Copenhagen Business School, Warming warnings get overheated, 2008, [http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/15/carbonemissions.climatechange]\*\*Reject](http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/15/carbonemissions.climatechange%5D%2A%2AReject) gendered language

Much of the global warming debate is perhaps best described as a constant outbidding by frantic campaigners, producing a barrage of ever-more scary scenarios in an attempt to get the public to accept their civilisation-changing proposals. Unfortunately, the general public – while concerned about the environment – is distinctly unwilling to support questionable solutions with costs running into tens of trillions of pounds. Predictably, this makes the campaigners reach for even more outlandish scares. These alarmist predictions are becoming quite bizarre, and could be dismissed as sociological oddities, if it weren't for the fact that they get such big play in the media. Oliver Tickell, for instance, writes that a global warming causing a 4C temperature increase by the end of the century would be a "catastrophe" and the beginning of the "extinction" of the human race. This is simply silly. His evidence? That 4C would mean that all the ice on the planet would melt, bringing the long-term sea level rise to 70-80m, flooding everything we hold dear, seeing billions of people die. Clearly, Tickell has maxed out the campaigners' scare potential (because there is no more ice to melt, this is the scariest he could ever conjure). **But he is wrong.** Let us just remember that the UN climate panel, the IPCC, expects a temperature rise by the end of the century between 1.8 and 6.0C. Within this range, the IPCC predicts that, by the end of the century, sea levels will rise 18-59 centimetres – Tickell is simply **exaggerating by a factor of up to 400.** Tickell will undoubtedly claim that he was talking about what could happen many, many **millennia from now.** But this is disingenuous. First, the 4C temperature rise is predicted on a century scale – this is what we talk about and can plan for. Second, although sea-level rise will continue for many centuries to come, the models unanimously show that Greenland's ice shelf will be reduced, but Antarctic ice will increase even more (because of increased precipitation in Antarctica) for the next three centuries. What will happen beyond that clearly depends much more on emissions in future centuries. Given that CO2 stays in the atmosphere about a century, what happens with the temperature, say, six centuries from now mainly depends on emissions five centuries from now (where it seems unlikely non-carbon emitting technology such as solar panels will not have become economically competitive). Third, Tickell tells us how the 80m sea-level rise would wipe out all the world's coastal infrastructure and much of the world's farmland – "undoubtedly" causing billions to die. But to cause billions to die, it would require the surge to occur within a single human lifespan. This sort of scare tactic is **insidiously wrong and misleading**, mimicking a firebrand preacher who claims the earth is coming to an end and we need to repent. While it is probably true that the sun will burn up the earth in 4-5bn years' time, it does give a slightly different perspective on the need for immediate repenting. Tickell's claim that 4C will be the beginning of our extinction is again **many times beyond wrong and misleading**, and, of course, **made with no data to back it up.** Let us just take a look at the realistic impact of such a 4C temperature rise. For the Copenhagen Consensus, one of the lead economists of the IPCC, Professor Gary Yohe, did a survey of all the problems and all the benefits accruing from a temperature rise over this century of about approximately 4C. And yes, there will, of course, also be benefits: as temperatures rise, more people will die from heat, but fewer from cold; agricultural yields will decline in the tropics, but increase in the temperate zones, etc. The model evaluates the impacts on agriculture, forestry, energy, water, unmanaged ecosystems, coastal zones, heat and cold deaths and disease. The bottom line is that benefits from global warming right now outweigh the costs (the benefit is about 0.25% of global GDP). Global warming will continue to be a net benefit until about 2070, when the damages will begin to outweigh the benefits, reaching a total damage cost equivalent to about 3.5% of GDP by 2300. This is simply **not the end of humanity.** If anything, global warming is a net benefit now; and even in three centuries, it will not be a challenge to our civilisation. Further, the IPCC expects the average person on earth to be 1,700% richer by the end of this century.

### 1ar – manufacturing

#### No threatening programs and current defenses solve.

Orent 09 [Wendy, Ph.D. in anthropology from the University of Michigan, leading freelance science writer, and author of Plague: The Mysterious Past and Terrifying Future of the World's Most Dangerous Disease, "America's Bioterror Bugaboo." Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles, CA) 17 Jul 2009: A.29. SIRS Researcher. Web. 29 January 2010]

After the anthrax letter attacks of October 2001, the Bush administration pledged $57 billion to keep the nation safe from bioterror. Since then, the government has created a vast network of laboratories and institutions to track down and block every remotely conceivable form of bioterror threat. The Obama administration seems committed to continuing the biodefense push, having just appointed a zealous bioterror researcher as undersecretary of science and technology in the Department of Homeland Security. But is the threat really as great as we've been led to believe? Last summer, the FBI concluded that the anthrax letters that killed five Americans came not from abroad but from an American laboratory, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. Meanwhile, the Russian bioweapons program was officially shut down in 1992, and it's unlikely that anything remaining of it could pose much of a threat. Iraq, it has turned out, had no active program. And Al Qaeda's rudimentary explorations were interrupted, according to an Army War College report, by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.

#### Capital inflows are good – they are key to long term growth

Griffith-Jones, neg author, 2k Stephany Griffith-Jones an economist specialising in international finance and development and an economist specialising in international finance and development “INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS TO

LATIN AMERICA” March, 2000 http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/7/4577/lcl1351i.pdf

One of the effects – and, indeed, one of the aims – of the reforms in Latin America, as well as elsewhere, has been to attract more capital flows. Often one of the indicators used to measure success of reforming economies has been whether they attract more capital flows in the post-reform period. This analysis was based on the assumption that the more capital flows of any type a country could attract, the more beneficial this was for growth and development.The highly problematic experience with capital flows in the 1990s, and much of the recent literature on the subject (Radelet and Sachs, 1998; Rodrik 1998; Bhagwati, 1998), raise the clear possibility that, for certain categories of capital flows (easily reversible ones) and especially if those flows enter on a very large scale, their long-term net growth and development benefits may be negative. While the high costs of reversals of these flows are evident, the benefits of inflows are less clear. At the same time, there is growing empirical evidence (Borensztein, de Gregorio and Lee, 1995; Ffrench-Davis and Reisen, 1998) that foreign direct investment (FDI)contributes to long-term growth. This is for three reasons: a) it is on the whole more stable; b) it is complementary to domestic investment, both in production and through positive spill over effects; and c) it stimulates growth through the embodied transfer of technology and efficiency, as well as facilitating access to foreign markets.If correct, this analysis implies a complex relationship between reforms, capital flows, and growth. Reforms in general, ceteris paribus, tend to attract more capital flows of all categories. It would seem that specific reforms – such as a certain type of capital account liberalization – tend to contribute more to attract larger amounts of potentially volatile capital flows, which can often undermine rather than contribute to the additional growth that other reforms, --such as trade liberalization-- are generating in the economy. At the same time, other reforms – such as privatization and labor market reforms – help to attract FDI, which seems to have clear net beneficial effects on growth. Also, on the positive side, it may be the case that those countries that have implemented "second generation" reforms (including aspects such as development of long-term capital markets and proper regulation of the domestic financial sector) in addition to a "first generation" of liberalizing reforms, may be somewhat less vulnerable to large reversals of capital flows. Above all they may recover access to capital and credit markets somewhat more easily. Indeed, it is also interesting to note that the international debt or financial crises originated in Latin America in the early 1980s (before the reforms), while in 1997-1999 the international financial crisis originated in other parts of the world. Less encouraging is the9 fact that Latin American countries are still being hit fairly severely by currency crises and contagion, in spite of their important efforts at structural reform and at improving macroeconomic policies.

#### US-Mexico trade high

ASCOA 8/1/13 – Americas Society (AS) is the premier forum dedicated to education, debate, and dialogue in the Americas. Council of the Americas (COA) is the premier international business organization whose members share a common commitment to economic and social development, open markets, the rule of law, and democracy throughout the Western Hemisphere (“Reasons why the US-Mexico border Is critical to the economy”, voxxi, http://www.voxxi.com/us-mexico-border-critical-to-economy/)//javi

1. US-Mexico trade surpasses $1 billion every day, with the vast majority of bilateral commerce crossing our land border. Mexico is the second largest destination of US goods and services after Canada. In 2012, US exports to Mexico totaled $216 billion—more than US exports to Japan and China combined. Mexico is the United States’ third largest trading partner. Since NAFTA was signed in 1994, bilateral trade levels have quintupled, reaching $494 billion in 2012. Close to 80 percent of bilateral trade crosses the US-Mexico land border every day.